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ABSTRACT
There is value for lawyers in thinking about constructs of rules as games on one
hand, or models on the other. Games are real in a way models are not. Games have
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"thingness"--an independent reality-and they can be played. Models have
"aboutness"-they map onto something else that is real for the sake of simplification
and explanation. But models and games are not dichotomous as the preceding claim
makes them out to be. Sometimes models look just like games, and sometimes
games can serve as models. Because models look like games, we may come to
believe they are real-that the models have thingness rather than aboutness. People
are prone to think some of the models they deal in all the time are real, like games,
and perhaps even more real than the reality the models are supposed to represent.
When that happens unreflectively in business, ethical and legal problems can ensue.
There is also a relationship between games and models as a way of thinking, and
the position of the thinker as modeler, game creator, or game player. To engage in
any of those acts is to use the legally trained mind to make sense of what is going on,
and to act on it. But there are different ways of making sense, either by explaining or
understanding, and it is not common in legal education to undertake the exercise of
thinking about thinking, or theorizing about theory. I explore the consequence of
confusing games and models in two contexts, financial accounting and contract
interpretation, and consider the possibility of co-optation from models into games
and vice versa. I conclude that practicing lawyers (or law professors) need to think
about thinking itself or face the possibility of being misled by precisely the same
context facing their clients. In short, lawyers need to be pragmatic ontologists.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mine is an unusual pragmatic agenda, because I am not as interested in the
particular problems lawyers face as much as I am in how they think about the
problems. With all due respect to Edward Levi's classic tome,1 I have never been
quite sure what it means to reason (or think) like a lawyer.2 Langdellian legal
formalism, or legal realist contextualism, critical legal theory, and the variants of law
and economics that currently dominate the legal academy are all ways of making
sense of what is going on around us. They are the "theories" we use to organize the
'EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).
21 would wager that most lawyers, if asked for a quick answer, would call analogy their
core reasoning competency, at least in the analysis of case law. See Cass R. Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993). Professor Sunstein provides a
compilation of analyses of legal reasoning at footnote 3, the most important of which is
Edward Levi's contribution. Beyond legal analogy, there is a wealth of work in cognitive
science on the pre-cognitive role pattern recognition (i.e., modeling) and analogy play in the
very way we make sense of the world. See Joseph Agassi, Analogies Hard and Soft, in
ANALOGICAL REASONING: PERSPECTIVES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE SCIENCE,
AND PHILOSOPHY (David H. Helman ed., 1988); Max Black, Models and Archetypes, in
MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY (1962); DOUGLAS
HOFSTADTER & THE FLUID ANALOGIES RESEARCH GROUP, FLUID CONCEPTS AND CREATIVE
ANALOGIES: COMPUTER MODELS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MECHANISMS OF THOUGHT (1995);
Mark Johnson, Some Constraints on Embodied Analogical Understanding, in ANALOGICAL
REASONING: PERSPECTIVES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE SCIENCE, AND
PHILOSOPHY (David H. Helman ed., 1988); JOHN SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES
IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS (1979); JOHN SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1983); Mark Turner, Categories and Analogies, in ANALOGICAL
REASONING: PERSPECTIVES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE SCIENCE, AND
PHILOSOPHY (David H. Helman ed., 1988). I leave that for another time.
[Vol. 56:613
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data. In those cases, the theory (we hope) has academic rigor, but we have colloquial
"theories" all the time in everyday life. "Here's my theory why so-and-so got denied
tenure" is not a statement of scientific theory, but it is an attempt at explanation of
human behavior in a causal sense-we are amateur historians trying to make sense
why something happened.
I propose to organize "thinking like a lawyer" in terms of our approach to
complex constructs of rules that appear to us in some instances to be games and in
other instances to be models. A lawyer can be modeler, game creator, or game
player. A lawyer writing the provision of a business acquisition agreement that
describes the business being sold is a modeler. A lawyer writing the procedural
rules in the agreement for resolving the post-closing price adjustment, or for
determining whose counsel will have primary responsibility for defending a third
party claim under the indemnification provision is a game creator. The lawyer
litigating these issues in arbitration or in court is a game player.3 To engage in any
of those acts is to use the legally trained mind to make sense of what is going on, and
to act on it. But there are different ways of making sense, and it is not common in
legal education to undertake the exercise of thinking about thinking, or theorizing
about theory. That is what I intend to do here.
There is certainly nothing wrong with modeling-legal formalism, or law and
economics, being examples-as a way of making sense of human behavior. But
lawyers, it seems to me, need to recognize that "thinking like a lawyer" (at least in
the formal or economic way) is very much a cultural phenomenon of the last 150
years or so. Indeed, thinking of the law as a science, as Langdell did when he
developed the case method, means that the lawyer thinks as objectively about human
affairs as a physicist might about atomic particles. The French philosopher Gabriel
Marceau described this mindset, and it strikes me as one we might well want in our
legal advisor:
[T]he scientist, in his conception of the external world, is and must be
completely a realist; he is concerned with an order of truths which he must
consider as wholly outside of, and completely distinct from, his own
self.... With the scientist, the self has, in so far as it possibly can,
vanished away. His task is to bring order into a world which is as little as
possible his own particular world, which is as much as possible the world
in general; and from his own point of view, it is certainly not up to him to
ask whether this notion of "the world in general" is a fiction.4
But what if the world of the lawyer as scientist turns out to be a fiction? If the lawyer
has bought into the notion that the world really is governed by the assumptions of
rational actor economics, or that the business is in reality nothing more than a
particular arithmetic result one gets by pushing revenue and cost data into the model
created by generally accepted accounting principles, can something go wrong?
3For a discussion of the game aspect of litigation, and its significance for legal ethics, see
Jack L. Sammons, "Cheater! ": The Central Moral Admonition of Legal Ethics, Games,
Lusory Attitudes, Internal Perspectives, and Justice, 39 IDAHO L. REv. 273 (2003).
41 GABRIEL MARCEL, THE MYSTERY OF BEING: REFLECTION AND MYSTERY 215-16 (G.S.
Fraser trans., St. Augustine's Press 2001) (1950).
2008]
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My answer is "yes." There are games we can play that are not a fiction. Trying a
case or playing football is real. Negotiating a business acquisition is real. There are
models we can create (including using games as models) that are fictions in the sense
that we understand, generally, that they mimic or illuminate, but are not the real
thing. If we are being responsible in public company disclosure practice, we
understand that generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") create just such a
model. But what if we lose that sense of objectivity about GAAP, and it becomes the
game? That is, we attribute thingness to the financial statements. What if we lose
sight of the places in which the business acquisition models an understanding, and
begin to believe it creates an understanding?
The business ethics literature is replete with evidence that unethical behavior
often has less to do with conscious moral choice than with the perceptual frames in
which people make decisions. Professors Tenbrunsel and Messick argue, for
example, that "ethical fading" is the "process by which the moral colors of an ethical
decision fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications."5 What many
businesses call "ethics training" is useless because "individuals do not 'see' the moral
components of an ethical decision"; instead "psychological processes fade the
'ethics' from an ethical dilemma."6
Like other observers of ethical behavior, I see no route to ethics other than
theorizing how our minds frame and rationalize moral decisions.' My contribution is
that the lawyer's or the ethicist's skill in identifying legal constructs as games or
models is one route to effective ethical, moral, and legal counseling in the business
and transactional environment. In psychological terms, it questions the decision-
making frames. In philosophical terms, it poses the ontological question, What is
real? Practicing lawyers (or law professors) need to think about thinking itself or face
the possibility of being misled by precisely the same context facing their clients.8 In
short, lawyers need to be pragmatic ontologists.
There are two polarities that lead me to games and models as one way of thinking
about thinking. The first is a first person-third person polarity. This is another way
of stating H.L.A. Hart's seminal treatment of the internal versus external point of
view. Hart contended that rules are something more than mere habits that an
external observer could record; rules are matters of obligation and not merely
5Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in
Unethical Behavior, 17 Soc. JUST. RES. 223, 224 (2004).
61d.
7Id. at 226 ("Understanding the mechanisms by which self-deception is exacerbated, the
'enablers' if you will, becomes the necessary next step."). See also David M. Messick & Max
H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision-Making, 37 SLOAN MGTrr.
REv. 9 (1996).
8Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 5, at 234 (citations omitted):
We must condition ourselves to be aware of the enablers of self-deception;
furthermore, we must be more critical of our judgments and motives driving both our
actions and our judgments of others' behaviors. Given the connection between
justification and unethical behavior, we must also question the justifications that we
concoct to rationalize our actions. By confronting the tendency toward self-deception
head on, we will be more likely to reduce its prevalence than if we ignore it and act as
if it did not exist.
[Vol. 56:613
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patterns of regularity. It is not merely an observable habit that chess players move
particularly pieces in particular ways; the players themselves "have a reflective
critical attitude to this pattern of behavior: they regard it as a standard for all who
play the game."9 The rules of conduct in chess, for example, have a meaning for the
game players that might not be readily apparent to the external observer.' ° Take the
example of a traffic light. The external point of view observes the regularities of
behavior, and begins to make predictions about whether conduct will meet with
hostile reaction or punishment. We begin to observe that cars facing red lights stop,
and those that do not stop cause accidents, or get tickets, or are honked at by other
drivers. To the internal point of view, the red light or green light is more than
prediction of behavior; it means something (red = stop or green = go) with regard to
their own behavior." Michael Moore distinguishes explanation (in Hart's extemal
sense) from non-natural meaning (in Hart's internal sense), even though we can say,
externally, red lights mean that cars will stop, in the same way we can use the phrase
"clouds mean rain" to suggest a predictive natural relationship. 2
The second polarity has to do with how some constructs of rules differ from
others in their relative "thingness" or "aboutness." There have been occasional
references to this in the academic literature. June Carbone quoted an unidentified
Stanford professor to the effect that what distinguishes the law of property is the
"thingness of it."' 3 Another commentator coined the concept of "aboutness" with
regard to contracts.' 4 In his classic essay, Arthur Leff observed that the "paper with
words" that accompanies a consumer product really is a thing in the nature of a label
or a warning, rather than a contract to which the ill-fitting precepts of contract law
apply.'5 Leff as well saw something different about property; he observed that
Hohfeld's vocabulary of claims, privileges, powers, and immunities in property
failed to take hold not because of any failure in the analysis, "but more of the fact
that a farm, for instance, bundle of powers, privileges, rights, etc. or not, persists in
the consciousness as 'dirt with boundaries."" 6 Perhaps the most extensive treatment
of "thingness" is Michael Madison's consideration of the ways in which the law
9H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56-57 (1961).
'lId. at 89-90. The internal point of view entails a "critical reflective attitude" that make a
rule "a standard of behaviour and an obligation."
"id. The observer with an external point of view sees not rules as such, but "observable
regularities of conduct, predictions, probabilities, and signs."
'
2Michael Moore, Interpreting Interpretation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 3 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1997) (1995).
13June Carbone, Back to the Future: Intellectual Property and the Rediscovery of Property
Rights - and Wrongs, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 629, 630 (2002).
14Jonathan Yovel, What is Contract Law "About"? Speech Act Theory and a Critique of
"Skeletal Promises," 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 937 (2000).
15Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970).
'
6Id. at 157.
2008]
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should treat intangible things that come into being as the result of design, contract,
practice or policy. 7
Neither polarity, it seems to me, fully accounts for the way lawyers in practice
interact with rules. My thesis is that the two polarities-first person-third person and
aboutness-thingness--come together if we think about constructs of rules as games
versus models. Games and models, including legal games and models, are both
constructs of rules. Games are real in a way that models are not. Games have
thingness-an independent reality, and models have aboutness-they map onto
something else that is real. But models and games are not dichotomous as the
preceding claim makes them out to be. Sometimes models look just like games, and
sometimes games can serve as models. Because models look like games, we may
come to believe they are real-that the models have thingness rather than aboutness.
People are prone to think some of the models they deal in all the time are real, like
games, and perhaps even more real than the reality the models are supposed to
represent. When that happens unreflectively in business, ethical and legal problems
can ensue.
While I believe the distinction between games and models ultimately comports
with our common intuitions, and is helpful in making sense of what lawyers do, I
also acknowledge this is an ambitious recasting of the philosophy of rules, and thus
need to provide some concrete examples in law and business."8 In Part II, I explore
17Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 381 (2005).
18John Searle begins his seminal monograph on speech acts with an analysis that capsules
my dilemma. He criticizes skepticism about concepts like analyticity and synonymy. Searle's
point is elegant and ironic. The critics of the use of the concept say it lacks criteria, and hence
the notion is "illegitimate, defective, incoherent, unempirical, or the like." John R. Searle,
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 5 (Cambridge University Press 1970)
(1969). Hence the skeptics about the concept will pose a proposition that is borderline
between analytic and synthetic, noting that the criteria are insufficient to categorize it. Searle
observes that our very "recognition of it as a puzzling case, far from showing that we do not
have any adequate notion of analyticity, tends to show precisely the reverse. We could not
recognize borderline cases of a concept as borderline cases if we did not grasp the concept to
begin with." Id. at 8. Searle's point is that our inability to explain our intuition about the
validity of a concept with existing criteria does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is
the concept that is lacking; it may be the criteria.
We have encountered a more mundane example of this puzzle in studying one of the
canons of securities law, the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946),
and its progeny on the interpretation of the definition of a "security" under § 2(a)(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The definition has three
parts: (1) an "unless the context requires otherwise" disclaimer, (2) a laundry list of things like
stocks, notes, bonds, and debentures, and (3) two catch-alls, "investment contracts" and "any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Howey announced the rule by which
a transaction would be deemed an "investment contract" and hence a security within the
purview of the regulatory system: it is one in which a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.
There is a wonderful circularity here. We have a list of things that are per se "securities"
without need of further definition, but we need to put in the words of a rule or definition the
common thread that gives them security-ness for purposes of defining what goes into the
catch-all. We know what a security is even before we embark on the process of defining it,
and the law professor's game is to point out those paradoxes where application of the
[Vol. 56:613
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the idea of contrasting legal constructs as games and legal constructs as models in
more depth. First, what do I mean by "game" and what do I mean by "model"?
Second, what does it mean to claim that a game is real and has "thingness" or that a
model is not real and has "aboutness"? How does the complexity of games and
models contribute to confusion between the two? Finally, what kinds of legal
constructs have more "thingness" than other areas of the law that have model-like
"aboutness"? I use examples from commercial law (Article 2 is model-like; Article
9 is game-like), business association law (corporations are somewhat more game-like
and partnerships are somewhat more model-like), and contracts (those elements of a
business acquisition agreement, like the description of the business being sold, that
are model-like, and those, like the post-closing price adjustment or the
indemnification rules, that are game-like),
In Part III, I explore the consequence of confusing games and models in two
contexts, and consider the co-optation from models into games and vice versa. The
first context is financial accounting. Language itself is a kind of game (so the
philosophers of language teach us) reflecting shared understandings of linguistic
communities. The language of accounting is complex and nuanced, but, I contend,
ultimately intended to assist business managers in creating financial models of their
businesses. But the power of the language game is such that participants in the
financial reporting process can be co-opting into the game of accounting rather than
using accounting to model, as accurately as possible, the reality of an underlying
business. The second context is contract interpretation. I consider how a law-and-
economics approach to contract interpretation uses a model versus a game approach,
and hence fails to appreciate that modelers and game players often view differently
what constitutes a satisfactory statement why something happened the way it did.
In Part IV, I explore the consequences for lawyers of failing to distinguish
between legal games and legal models, or more positively, the benefits they bring as
compliance officers and transaction counselors when they are able to assess the
patterns-game or model-they and other participants in the bigger game of
business are using to organize their sensory data. I address this in two different
aspects: effectiveness as a transactional lawyer, and the possibility of the tainting of
ethical or compliance judgment. In Part V, I attempt to reconcile my game-model
distinction, and its attendant concerns about scientific explanation and attributive
cause-and-effect, into the intellectual history of the social sciences of the last
hundred years.
II. LEGAL CONSTRUCTS AS GAMES AND MODELS
Someone says to me: "Shew the children a game." I teach them gaming
with dice, and the other says "That sort of game isn't what I meant."'9
definition (e.g., a neighbor's pooling and sale of cherries off the trees in our northern
Michigan subdivision) leads us to call something a security that we already know, intuitively,
is not.
So for the time being, I will use terms like "aboutness" and "thingness" as I look for more
rigorous ways of getting at the difference.
19LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, 2 8e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
2001).
2008]
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A. What Makes a Game?
Are the following games or models? Football. Marginal revenue and cost
curves. Financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. Business acquisition agreements. The prisoner's dilemma.
We need to start by being as clear as we can about what a game is. Consider,
merely for the range, the number of alternative dictionary definitions: "activity
engaged in for diversion or amusement"; "a procedure for gaining an end: TACTIC";
"a physical or mental competition conducted according to rules with the participants
in direct opposition to each other"; "a field of gainful activity: LINE <the newspaper
game>"; "any activity undertaken or regarded as a contest involving rivalry, strategy,
or struggle <the dating game>.""° In his explication of what he called the language
game, Wittgenstein used the word "game" itself to demonstrate that all the ways we
use the word game resemble each other as do members of a family. Solitaire is a
game, so the definition cannot turn wholly on there being more than one participant;
tic-tac-toe is a game, but it is hardly amusing; being in the newspaper or the
investment banking game is one's life, not a diversion. We need to take
Wittgenstein's advice that there is nothing common to every usage of "game," but
instead there are "similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that."'"
Each example bears a similarity to the last, but each is slightly different.2
Where does our willingness to call something a game stop? Picking up the dog
dishes, taking them to the basement, filling them with kibble, and setting them back
down in front of the dogs is not a game. We could agree something that looks like
feeding the dogs is a game (the first dog to reach the dish gets fed first), but the point
is the absence of a defined frontier to the concept.2 3 But if language (according to
Wittgenstein) is practice, then there must be something we understand to be game-
like not just in Scrabble®, but in the ways we go about our lives.
Therefore, after Wittgenstein, we should know better than to attempt to find a
common thread or denominator for all usages of "game" or for all usages of
"model." Nevertheless, I have asserted that games are real and have thingness in a
way that models do not. So I must be saying that something common to some usages
of games is that they are real, and that something common to some usages of models
is that they are not. Put another way, board games are real. A marginal cost and
revenue graph is a model in the sense of being a system of postulates, data and
inferences are representations of something else, but it does not have thingness in the
same way that a board game does. But the usages blur at the edges. The prisoner's
dilemma,24 undoubtedly a game (particularly if you happen to be one of the
20MERRAM-WEBSTER'S DELUXE DICTIONARY 753 (10th ed. 1998).
21WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 2 7e .
22Arthur Leff undertook this exercise of "family resemblances" in his analysis of the
critical definitional components of "contract," including that it be interpersonal, be more or
less communicative, bear on the future, be limited in the extent of the relationship and so on.
Leff, supra note 15, at 137-39.
231d. at 28e-29e.
24The prisoner's dilemma is the classic example in game theory of the paradoxical result
occurring where the two players' dominant strategies result in each of them being worse off
[Vol. 56:613
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prisoners), is used as a model, and the dictionary definition of a model includes the
person or thing that serves as the object of the artist's work.
Let me first work from the core idea of game toward the idea of model. John
Searle's seminal work in Speech Acts26 provides a source for making at least some
distinction between games and models. Searle's thesis is that language is a game,
and it operates according to an implicit mutually accepted set of rules. But what
makes it a game has to do with the nature of the rules that establish the game. The
key concept is the difference between constitutive and regulative rules.27 While
regulative rules "regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior,"
constitutive rules "do not merely regulate, they create or define new rules of
behavior."28 The classic examples of constitutive rules are those of a game like
football or chess. The rule that crossing the goal line is a touchdown creates the
concept of touchdown; the rule that we may not turn right on a red light merely
regulates the antecedently created behavior of driving. 9 New forms of activity
than if they stopped playing strategically and cooperated. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H.
GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33-35 (1994).
25What about the game of life? Is it a real game, or are we here using "game" as a model
or allusion to something game-like about life?
2 6 JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 33-42
(1970).
27For other treatments of this distinction, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE
(2002); Max Black, The Analysis of Rules, in MODELS AND METAPHORS, supra note 2, at 95;
H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 21 (1983); David Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 233 (1983); JOSEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (Princeton Univ. Press
1999) (1975).
28Kant used the adjectives in a somewhat different way. He distinguished between
constitutive principles that might be the subject of knowledge, and the regulative principle,
which is reason itself. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 520-24 (Paul Guyer &
Allen W. Wood trans., Cambridge University Press, 1998) (1787).
29The concept of "constitutiveness" (and its illustration by means of games) arises in the
debate about the source of the rule of recognition in H.L.A. Hart's positive law jurisprudence.
Most positivists accept that the rule of recognition, the secondary rule that tells officials what
primary rules constitute valid law, is a matter of common practice of recognizing some rules
as law, and some as not. The more controversial issue is whether the fact of the common
practice-that it is "conventional"--is part of the legal reason why people consider the rule of
recognition to be binding. See Julie Dickson, Is the Rule of Recognition Really
Conventional?, 27 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 373, 375-76 (2007). Some of the debate swirls
around what Hart meant, particularly in his response in the "Postscript" to the Second Edition
of THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961), supra note 9. The "non-conventional" position is that the
point of the rule of recognition is that it validates other rules, but there is no further rule that
validates it. Dickson, supra, at 377.
I do not here take a position on the debate, but observe merely that one of the
"conventionalists" is Andrei Marmor, who takes the position that "there are constitutive
conventions of autonomous social practices, of which the rule of recognition is one." Id at
391 (quoting ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VALUES 12 (2001)). Marmor's
point is that the set of rules constituting the practice creates its own reason for being, and for
being followed:
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created by constitutive rules may contain regulative rules. Fred Schauer uses the
example of clipping in football. It is a constitutive rule to call hitting someone from
behind clipping. It is a regulative rule to make it illegal.30
If we begin by anchoring ourselves in the concept of games, for example, board
games, the constitutive rules are clear. The rules of Scrabble® are set forth in a
booklet or printed on the inside of the box cover. The rules can change, but only if
we make express accommodations (ground rules, so to speak). As we move from the
core of a game as concrete and real as something like Scrabble® or football to
language as a game, we gain and lose attributes of what makes something game-like.
My point here is that even when we are talking about something as ephemeral as the
language game, the game still involves players and not mere observers. The rules of
the language game are real, but far more fluid, and we accommodate the fluidity by
changing the rules. 3 Nevertheless, players in the language game are not modelers. I
have in mind the 1982 Disney movie Tron, in which Jeff Bridges' character hacks
into a computer game, is sucked into the program, and becomes an actual participant
in the virtual battle. He transformed from modeler (programmer) to player
(gladiator).32 In short, in addition to rules, we can say the game is real if we have
People who play chess follow the rules of the game because by doing so they can
engage in an activity they regard as, say, intellectually rewarding. Whatever the
reason for having the game might be, or whatever "problem" it was invented to solve,
would have little bearing on the reasons people have for playing it. Once the game is
there to play, it establishes, as it were, its own point.
Id. at 13.
30 SCHAUER, supra note 27, at 6-7. The constitutive rules of football create the concept of a
defensive back's chuck of a receiver, but in recent years a change in the regulative rules made
a chuck more than five yards from the line of scrimmage illegal. Compare that to the change
in rules under which the American League adopted the designated hitter in 1973. That was a
change in the constitutive rules, and I think the reaction to the change has to do with
something more than its magnitude or its impact. To this day, there is a sense among some
baseball fans that the designated hitter rule fundamentally changed baseball in a way that, say,
that raising or lowering the pitcher's mound did not.
3"As David Lewis points out, the constitutive rules in language games move and adapt
themselves-they accommodate-in a way that the constitutive rules of a board game or a
sport do not. Lewis posits "rules of accommodation" for presuppositions and permissibility in
language games. As to presupposition, if you say "all Suffolk Law School's professors are
leaders in their respective disciplines" you do not need to add, "and Suffolk has professors."
The listener will accommodate the speaker by immediately presupposing, even if she does not
already know, that Suffolk Law School indeed must have professors. As to permissibility, the
rule depends upon the speaker being the master, and the master being in control of what is
permissible. The master is able to change what is permissible and impermissible. In other
words, there is a boundary, but the master can change it. The rule of accommodation is that if
the master says something to the listener:
about permissibility ... that requires for its truth the permissibility or impermissibility
of certain course[s] of action, and if just before [the time of the statement] the
boundary is such as to make the master's statement false, then ... the boundary shifts
[at the time of the statement] so as to make the master's statement true.
Lewis, supra note 27, at 234-35.
321ntemet Movie Data Base, TRON, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0084827/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2007).
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players in it, and not merely using the idea of a game as a model to explain
something else.
B. What Makes a Model?
If we are going to compare games and models, we should also start from the core
idea of a model and work the other way toward a game. We begin with the same
observation about the various usages for the word "model." The dictionary says a
model is, alternatively, "a usu. miniature representation of something; also: a pattern
of something to be made"; "a person or thing that serves as a pattern for an artist;
esp: one who poses for an artist"; "a description or analogy used to help visualize
something (as an atom) that cannot be directly observed"; "a system of postulates,
data, and inferences presented as a mathematical description of an entity or state of
affairs[.]" 33  The core of a model is that it is a representation or a pattern of
something else, but the essence of a scientific model is that the model is simpler than
the reality, and somehow manages to capture what is important about the reality in a
way that helps us make sense.
It may be helpful to understand models by first understanding something about
the complex systems they seek to represent. One insight of a body of work called
complexity theory is that highly complex systems can, counter intuitively, arise from
very simple initial states, and even with a limited number of simple algorithms.34
But as complexity theorists have acknowledged, it is far easier to generate a complex
system from simple assumptions than it is to look at a complex system and reduce it
to its fundamental axioms; in short, to create a model.35 Given a complex system,
the question is whether a less complex model (i.e., one more efficient in space and
time) can determine the initial states from which the system grew. As the theorists
note, there are theoretical limitations to modeling systems. If the system being
modeled can itself act as a universal computer, then the model needs to be more
efficient in space and time than the system, which is not possible. This is called
"computational irreducibility." As an example,
331MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 746 (10th ed. 2002).
34See, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN & ARTHUR W. BURKS, THEORY OF SELF-REPRODUCING
AUTOMATA (1966); W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the Economy, 284 SCIENCE 107 (Apr. 2,
1999); W. Brian Arthur, The End of Economic Certainty, in THE BIOLOGY OF BUSINESS 31
(J.H. Clippinger, ed., 1999); Stephen Wolfram, Complex System Theory (1984),
http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/ca/84-complex/index.html. Peter Alces
has explored complexity theory as a metaphor for the ways in which we think about legal
concepts like justice, and summarizes Wolfram's generation of cellular automata. Peter Alces,
On Discovering Doctrine: "Justice" in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 471, 507-19
(2005).
35STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE 551 (2002). According to Wolfram:
[I]t is rather easy to generate complex behavior by starting from simple initial
conditions and then following simple sets of rules. But the point is that if one starts
from some particular piece of behavior there are in general no such simple rules that
allow one to go backwards and find out how this behavior can be produced. Typically
the problem is similar to trying to find solutions that will satisfy certain constraints.
Id.; Alces, supra note 34, at 512 n. 164.
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[t]he development of an organism from its genetic code may well be a
computational irreducible process. Effectively the only way to find out
the overall characteristics of the organism may be to grow it explicitly.
This would make large-scale computer-aided design of biological
organisms, or "biological engineering," effectively impossible: only
explicit search methods analogous to Darwinian evolution could be used.36
Thus, filtering out the non-relevant data is the essence of modeling and
prediction. Modeling from complexity to simplicity is most apparent in the most
deductive of systems: computer science. There, the complexity of a sequence is an
indicator of the cost of generating the sequence in memory storage (space) and in
central processing unit expenditure (time).37 The point of a model is to take the
many bits of information available in a universe, and to construct an explanation
(algorithmic in the case of a computer) that has a fair probability, in far fewer bits, of
being able to replicate the actual universe of inputs.38
Game theory is a less deductive but typical form of modeling. The leading work
on the application of game theory in the law observes:
Game theory, like all economic modeling, works by simplifying a given
social situation and stepping back from the many details that are irrelevant
to the problem at hand. The test of a model is whether it can hone our
intuition by illuminating the basic forces that are at work but not plainly
visible when we look at an actual case in all its detail. The spirit of the
enterprise is to write down the game with the fewest elements that
captures the essence of the problem. The use of the word "game" is
appropriate because one can reduce the basic elements of complicated
social and economic interactions to forms that resemble parlor games.39
36Wolfram, supra note 34.
37F.T. Arecchi, Complexity, Complex Systems, and Adaptation, 879 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
Sci. 45, 46 (1999). A problem is computationally intractable (or irreducible) when there is no
known algorithm that can model the problem short of recreating the problem. Id. One
example is the "traveling salesman problem," in which a salesperson must make calls in a
number of cities, but visit each one of them just once, and return to the starting point, and
minimize the total distance:
It turns out that as the number of cities on the list grows, the problem becomes
increasingly difficult; the number of route combinations grows exponentially with the
number of cities in the salesman's tour. No solution more efficient than simply
enumerating all the possible combinations of travel routes is known (though no one
has proved such a solution does not exist).
Joseph F. Traub, The Unknown and the Unknowable, THE SCIENCES, Jan.- Feb. 1999, at 39, 43-
44.
38Arecchi, supra note 37, at 48 ("The virtue of the explanation X is to have a bit length
lixl1 = limll [- is the explanatory model] + liell [e is an error signal representing the
probability of the model being wrong] much shorter than the sequence length 11s11. [T]his
amounts to extracting a relevant semantics out of the redundant features of s.").
39DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 7 (1994).
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Note how models are also based in rules, and, indeed, in constitutive rules that
create the model. But the essence of a model is third person objectivity. The
modeler is not a game player-she is observing a complex slice of reality, and using
a tool to reduce it to something shorter, simpler, and more understandable, at least as
to the point the modeler wants to make. It seems to me no coincidence that we often
use games as models, first because seeing a particular complex reality in the form of
the game simplifies and explains it, and second because using the game as a model
permits the objective observer-modeler to teach or explain the actions of the
subjective player. o
C. Games, Models, Complexity, and Thingness
My thesis here is that complex constructs of rules, whether games or models, take
on a relative "thingness." When they are sufficiently complex, models look like
games, and games look like models.
I want to juxtapose two views of "thingness." In Law's Quandary, Steven D.
Smith wonders why we talk about the law almost as a living thing with its own
independent intentionality:
We acknowledge . . . that of course lawyers (and many non-lawyers)
constantly and routinely refer to "the law" as if it were some entity, or
some thing that exists independently of us and possesses some more or
less definite content that is somehow authoritative for us. We describe a
situation or problem and then ask, "What's 'the law' on that?" Or we
make assertions about "what 'the law' requires. '
The quandary is that we continue to speak of the law this way, even though we
would be inclined to the realist view that law is only what legislators and judges say
it is, and not "the 'brooding omnipresence in the sky' of Holmes' derision. '2
40One of the leading complexity theorists in economics, W. Brian Arthur, made this
observation about the problems inherent in trying to create an objective model of the
economy:
In the standard view of the economy, which has an intellectual lineage that goes back
to the Enlightenment, the economy is mechanistic. It can be viewed as a complicated
set of objects (products, markets, resources, technologies, demands) with linkages
between them. Subject and object -agents and the economy in which they perform-
can be neatly separated. The view I am giving here is different. It says that the
economy itself emerges from our subjective beliefs. These subjective beliefs, taken in
the aggregate, structure the micro economy. They give rise to the character of
financial markets. They direct flows of capital and govern strategic behavior and
negotiations. They are the DNA of the economy. These subjective beliefs are a priori
or deductively indeterminate in advance. They co-evolve, arise, decay, change,
mutually reinforce, and mutually negate. Subject and object cannot be neatly
separated. And so the economy shows behavior that we can best describe as organic,
rather than mechanistic. It is not a gigantic, well-ordered machine. It is organic. At
all levels it contains pockets of indeterminacy. It emerges from subjectivity and falls
back into subjectivity.
Arthur, The End of Certainty in Economics, supra note 34, at 44-45.
4 1STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 52 (2004).
421d. at 155.
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Professor Smith's answer to the question is to suggest hopefully and gingerly that
perhaps there is some kind of immanence, a "Transcendental Author," so to speak,
that is speaking through the texts that constitute "the law.
''3
Smith sees a complex construct (put aside for now whether it is a game or a
model) that by all accounts is without individual intentionality, and hopes to find
intentionality. At the other end of the complex thingness spectrum, Douglas
Hofstadter (reflecting the views, I believe, of Daniel Dennett and other evolutionary
and cognitive scientists) suggests that intentionality, at least intentionality having its
source in "transcendence" is an illusion, or, better put, a consequence of
complexity." On this view, there is no difference between a mechanical universal
computing machine and a biological version. The appearance of intentionality arises
at the point where systems are able to turn and reflect upon themselves-a "threshold
of complexity and memory size."45 "In the world of living things, the magic
threshold of representational universality is crossed whenever a system's repertoire
of symbols becomes extensible without any obvious limit. This threshold was
crossed... somewhere along the way from earlier primates to ourselves."
Both Smith and Hofstadter are grappling with the same issue, albeit from wholly
opposing starting points. Each is concerned with the apparent purposiveness of the
order we perceive in the world, whether in Smith's case, it is the construct of rules
we call "the law," or, in Hofstadter's case, the perception of "the self." The major
difference between the two is the willingness to accept something transcendental as
an explanation.
If we see the construct of rules as a game, at least some variations of the concept
will include an explicit purpose: to win or to succeed under whatever conditions
constitute success in the game. But complex models have a more subtle relationship
to purposiveness. We need not resolve the question of whether a system like the law
actually has a Transcendent Author any more than we need resolve the question of
whether intentionality is nothing more than the result of a sufficiently complex
system whose development will ultimately be describable in the science of
evolutionary biology. That a construct of rules, like the Internal Revenue Code, or
GAAP, or Article 9, can be viewed as implicitly purposive means that the construct,
whether it is a game or a model, is capable of being viewed as a game. Without
engaging in too much amateur psychology, it is entirely reasonable that the
competitive sorts who become lawyers might equate achieving the implicit purpose
of the model, whatever that is, with the achievement of success in the game.
D. Comparing Games and Models in the Law
We could create a parlor game of identifying games and models in the law; the
following are my initial contributions.
Commercial law. For reasons (with which I agree) that have been articulated
elsewhere, I have never been enamored with Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
431d. at 172-79.
44DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, I AM A STRANGE LooP 319-31 (2007).
45Id. at 243.
46Id. at 246.
47See Appendix A infra.
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Code.48 The drafters' attempt to address the downside of formal rules by forsaking
clear default rules for fuzzy but realistic business principles (like "reasonableness")
resulted in law neither admired for its realism nor useful as a set of default rules.
Even teaching Article 2 (and, to a large extent, contracts) is, to a long-time
practitioner like me, a somewhat archaic exercise. In my experience, most real
business disputes are about interpretation, and not things like offer and acceptance or
consideration or defenses. In contrast, I had never taken a secured transactions
course in law school, and dealt with Article 9 only cursorily in practice. To my
surprise, I found the process of learning it and teaching it to be immensely satisfying,
far more so than Article 2.
I concluded that the reason had to do with Article 9 being a game with thingness.
The rules in Article 9 actually create a thing, a game, out of whole cloth. The key
construct in the game is the security interest, which would not exist but for its
definitional creation in the UCC 9 Depending on your particular interest as debtor,
secured creditor, unsecured creditor, or trustee in bankruptcy, you win the game by
creating an enforceable security interest, or by defeating the security interest." The
game has rules of conduct and procedure, but it is as much a game as football, which
would not exist but for the establishment of foundational rules that set the field, the
points for a touchdown, what constitutes a first down or clipping, and so on.
In contrast, the rules of Article 2, and, indeed, of the law of contracts generally,
are "about" an antecedent and independently existing practice-the social
relationship of promising-and therefore more like a model of something else. Take
section 2-207, the infamous provision dealing with the "battle of the forms" as an
example. The drafters of the UCC observed a morass of communications out of
which the parties might well have thought they had an agreement, but courts
applying the classical rules of offer and acceptance (the "mirror image") would not.
Section 2-207 does not say "this is what you must do to create a contract" in the
same way Article 9 spells out precisely what you must do to create, attach, and
perfect a security interest. Instead, section 2-207 tries to create a model of what is
going on, and to interpret the parties' moves and counter-moves in the context of the
model.
Business association law. Corporate law has a game-like quality in much the
same way. What we do in setting up the corporation is not unlike arranging the
playing pieces when we begin a board game like Monopoly®. With a set of
constitutive rules, we create the playing field (incorporating the corporation,
designating the number of seats on the board, creating offices, authorizing and
issuing shares), identify the players by role (officer, director, shareholder), and give
48See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1999); Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of
Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
11(2007).
49A "'[s]ecurity interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (1977).
5
°For example, U.C.C. § 9-336(a) (2000) defines commingled goods as those "physically
united with other goods in such a manner that their identity is lost in a product or mass." The
rules of the game are that the secured party loses its security interest in goods that become
commingled goods.
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them their playing pieces (shares). There are plenty of regulative rules authorizing,
permitting, and prohibiting particular acts by particular players; they are found in the
state and federal corporate law, the charter, and the bylaws.
In contrast, partnership law begins, at least, with model-like aboutness. The law
has an image of what it means to be a partner, and imposes legal obligations on the
parties if what they do is to act like partners, whether or not they intend to do so."'
Interestingly, partnership law illuminates some of the nuance in the game-model
distinction. Partnership law does not forbid the parties from opting out of the model
and into games they create themselves. As we will see, it is certainly possible for
lawyers as game-creators to construct a more game-like arrangement through the
partnership agreement. But in the default situation, partnership is something of a
game-model hybrid, because only by having been so deemed does the arrangement
takes on some "thingness." Hence, we have the long-standing debate over whether
partnerships are entities (i.e., things in themselves) or merely contractual
aggregations of assets (i.e., a legal model that is about what the parties have done).
Contracts. Contracts are the most interesting subject of the game. Like an
electron, which sometimes looks like a wave and sometimes looks like a particle, a
contract is an elusive thing. Sometimes it is a model and not real. Sometimes it
creates a game, and is a thing and is real. And sometimes it is (or becomes) a
playing piece in a bigger game like a negotiation or litigation.52 As an example, a
typical business acquisition will have a provision called the post-closing price
adjustment. The buyer will undertake due diligence on the present state of the
business it is buying, and the centerpiece of that effort is usually a balance sheet
(called the "reference balance sheet") from the most recent year or quarter end
(because the seller will have usually prepared one in the ordinary course of its
business), subject to agreed adjustments. But the parties recognize that the balance
sheet, along with the description of business assets being sold and liabilities being
transferred, all as described in the contract, are a model.
In theory, at least, the net book equity in the most recent balance sheet becomes a
numerical proxy for the value of the business, regardless of the price negotiated
between the parties.53 There is, invariably, a delay between the balance sheet used in
negotiating the contract and the actual closing date, so the parties often include what
is known as a post-closing adjustment provision. Typically, the parties prepare a
balance sheet as of the closing date, and the net difference in book equity will
51
"[T]he association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit
forms a partnership, whether or not the parties intend to form a partnership." UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 202(a) (1997) (emphasis added).
521 am distinguishing between the idea of contract as a game (and games have thingness)
and the idea of contract as a thing, which was the point of Arthur Leff's article. He saw the
"paper with words" accompanying a product as a physical thing, not as a legal contract,
whatever that meant. See generally Leff, supra note 15. I am not concerned about the
physical contract itself, but about the construct of rules that it creates, and whether those are
more game-like or model-like.
53There is no necessary relationship between the net book equity and the price. The net
book equity is an accounting calculation under GAAP and generally reflects historical costs of
assets, not market values. Price is a negotiated market transaction between a willing seller and
a willing buyer. Hence, for example, the net book equity of a business sold for $500 million
could be $98 million or $500 million or $1 billion.
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correspond dollar for dollar to an adjustment in the purchase price. For example, the
net book equity of the business on the reference balance sheet was $200 million, with
a purchase price of $500 million, and the closing balance sheet showed net book
equity of $215 million, the buyer would owe the seller an additional $15 million in
purchase price.
In drafting the post-closing adjustment, the parties are creating a game. In
addition to defining the payoffs, there are game rules. Either the seller or the buyer
has the right to prepare the closing balance sheet. The other party will have the right
to object within a certain period of time. Often there are rules that attempt to ensure
that the same principles used in calculating the reference balance sheet are used in
calculating the closing balance sheet. The game rules specify who the referee will be
in the event of a dispute (usually one of the big accounting firms not already
associated with the parties). Indeed, having created the game rules, from time to
time the parties also have disputes, and actually play the game.54
Ill. THE CONSEQUENCE OF CONFUSING GAMES AND MODELS
The core concepts of game and model thus differ in two critical respects: first, a
game has independent reality, and second, a game involves players and not merely
observer-modelers. But games and models are each purposive in their own ways and
that purposiveness lends itself to confusion. In this section, I want to explore the bad
news: (1) there is a pragmatic consequence to confusing games and models, with
accounting systems and financial reporting being a prime example, and (2) there is a
difference between using a model to make "scientific" causal explanations about
game players we may be observing and understanding the causal reasons why game
players act the way they do. I show an example of mistaking causal explanations, in
a modeling sense, for causal reasons, in a game-playing sense, in a recent attempt by
two renowned law-and-economics scholars to posit a default rule for contract
interpretation. The good news is that because the issue of confusion is cognitive, we
ought to be able to reflect on it, and perhaps clear up the confusion.
A. The Reality of Co-Optation: Financial Reporting as Model and Game
1. The Constitutive and Regulative Rules of Financial Accounting
Whether or not running a business is a game, the process of reporting its financial
condition to the public is a complex language game consisting of thousands of
separate speech acts, from the organization of the balance sheet to the footnotes
explaining the status of litigation, to the tone of voice of the chief executive officer
54 To continue the game allusion, I explain what we are doing by using an analogy to
measurements in American football. I am always amused by the precision of the measurement
between where the football sits and the first down marker, when the football was placed on the
ground by an official who saw the play from as much as twenty-five yards away, and
estimated the spot with his toe. So I tell clients that the accounting rules will do the same
thing for our initial spotting of the value of the business from the reference balance sheet as
the official's estimate, but when we do the post-closing adjustment we want to make sure that
the measuring process is as accurate as the measurement on the first down markers.
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in the conference call with analysts on the day after the periodic earnings have been
released.55
Businesses report their financial results and condition in mandated forms-
income statements, balance sheets, cash flow statements-the rules for which are set
by GAAP. 5 6 GAAP itself is a language with game-like constitutive rules.57 The rules
are "man-made. '5 8 But GAAP financial statements are intended to model business
results, among other things, in the same way the language of microeconomics is
meant to model a firm's price and volume decisions, among other things. Both
simplify and explain an antecedently existing and far more complex form of
behavior-namely, a business. The authors of one of the definitive accounting texts
observed that using accounting information is akin to how a pilot uses information
from the airplane instruments. The instruments convey messages that probably mean
something about the reality of the airplane's situation in flight, but:
55To put this in the context of Searle's speech acts, the representatives of the company
make thousands of utterances (morphemes and sentences) which constitute either
propositional acts (referring and predicating) or illocutionary acts (stating, questioning, and
promising) about the business. SEARLE, supra note 26, at 24. Moreover, the process of
communicating about the company invokes what Searle (and J.L. Austin) call a perlocutionary
act, which adds "the notion of the consequences or effects such acts have on the actions,
thoughts, or beliefs, etc. of hearers." Id. at 25. Perlocutionary acts are those of the speaker
which, for example, persuade, alarm, convince, edify, inspire, or enlighten the listener. Id.
56See AUDITING STANDARDS BD. AU § 411 ("The phrase 'generally accepted accounting
principles' is a technical accounting term that encompasses the conventions, rules, and
procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practice at a particular time."); BARRY J.
EPSTEIN, RALPH NACH & STEVEN M. BRAGG, WILEY GAAP 2007: INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 1 (2006) ("Generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are concerned with the measurement of economic
activity, the time when such measurements are to be made and recorded, the disclosures
surrounding this activity, and the preparation and presentation of summarized economic
information in the form of financial statements.").
57ROBERT N. ANTHONY, DAVID F. HAWKINS & KENNETH A. MERCHANT, ACCOUNTING:
TEXT & CASES 8-9 (11 th ed., 2004) (observing that accounting is a language, with different
dialects, definite and indefinite rules, and is subject to evolution and change in response to the
changing needs of society). GAAP grows organically, like a language, as the result of
practice:
GAAP develops when questions arise about how to best accomplish those
objectives-measurement, timing of recognition, disclosure, or presentation. In
response to those questions, GAAP is either prescribed in official pronouncements of
authoritative bodies empowered to create it, or it originates over time through the
development of customary practices that evolves when authoritative bodies fail to
respond. Thus, GAAP is a reaction to and a product of the economic environment in
which it develops. As such, the development of accounting and financial reporting
standards has lagged the development and creation of increasingly intricate economic
structures and transactions.
EPSTEIN, NACH & BRAGG, supra note 56, at 1-2.
58ANTHONY, HAWKINS & MERCHANT, supra note 57, at 13. The term is that of the authors
of the accounting text, and I take it to mean that there is nothing necessary about accounting
rules. It is an arbitrary system.
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the word "probably" is used because, for one reason or another, an
instrument may not always give the reading it is supposed to give; the
pilot must realize this, and he must also understand something of the
likelihood, and the reasons for, these abnormalities . . . . Similarly a
person who is to make intelligent use of accounting information must
understand what a given accounting figure probably means, what its
limitations are, and the circumstances in which it may mean something
different from the apparent "signal" that it gives. "
Even if the ultimate goal of the financial accounting exercise is to present a
model of the current state of the business within acceptable tolerances, it is still a
model, and one that may not wholly represent the underlying reality of the business.
One part of the GAAP exercise requires management to certify, and the auditors to
confirm (in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards) that the written
financial statements fairly present as a whole, in all material respects, the financial
condition of the company. Certification of "fairly presents" has a shared meaning in
the rules and principles that constitute the language of GAAP. Both the accounting
profession and the courts recognize, however, that GAAP is not the exclusive, nor
necessarily even the best, language by which we communicate the state of a
business.6" The fact that the financial statements comport with GAAP (and fairly
present the financial condition) is not a defense to securities fraud if the managers
otherwise engaged in fraudulent transactions within the company.6' To put it another
59ANTHONY, HAWKINS & MERCHANT, supra note 57, at 7.
601d. ("[I]t seems intuitively sensible that accounting should report what a business is
'worth,' but accounting does not do this, or even attempt to do it."). For example, one of the
basic concepts of financial accounting is the understanding that accounting can only present a
record of facts expressible in monetary terms:
Despite its advantage, the money measurement concept imposes a severe limitation on
the scope of an accounting report. Accounting does not record the state of the
president's health, that the sales manager is not on speaking terms with the production
manager, that a strike is beginning, or that a competitor has placed a better product on
the market. Accounting therefore does not give a complete account of the happenings
in a organization or a full picture of its condition. It follows, then, that the reader of an
accounting report should not expect to find therein all of the facts, or perhaps even the
most important ones, about an organization.
Id. at 26. See also ROBERT B. DICKIE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS AND BUSINESS
VALUATION FOR THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 99 (1998) (financial statement earnings are not the
same as value, but earnings are a surrogate for value because they are easier to measure).
61United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969). In this case Judge
Friendly held that a financial statement did not fairly present the financial condition of a
publicly-traded company, even where the treatment of a receivable on a loan to an affiliate
was recorded and disclosed wholly in accordance with GAAP, but where the auditors knew
that the CEO of the company had diverted the proceeds of the loan from the affiliate to his
own personal use. Id. The problem in citing this case for a distinction between GAAP and
"fairly presents" is the court's own acknowledgment that once an accountant has reason to
believe that a corporation's affairs are not being conducted honestly, generally accepted
accounting principles require the accountant to extend procedures to determine whether the
suspicions are justified. Id. at 806-07.
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way, the financial statements may or may not correspond in a way, accepted by the
community, to another reality that is the true state of the business.62
Finally, the constitutive and regulative rules of accounting are game-like in their
relatively arbitrary nature, but nevertheless continue to model another reality. For
example, on the revenue side, "net income" is not the same as "cash flow" because
GAAP uses the accrual method to match revenues with the appropriate (at least with
GAAP) expenses within time periods like quarters and years.63 When a business
makes a sale it has "revenue" even though it does not receive the cash until later.
When a business incurs a liability for a cost it has an expense, even though it does
not make the expenditure until later.6' Revenue recorded when the product leaves
the shipping dock will fall to the bottom line as income and earnings to the extent it
is not offset by recorded expenses, but that does not necessarily mean the business
will see the cash. At the time of the shipment, the business, recognizing that
customers do not always pay, may record an allowance for bad debt (say, five
percent of the sales price), which is reflected on the balance sheet as a subtraction
from the accounts receivable assets.65 Hence, what the business records as revenue
approaches fiction: the number represents the sales price of what left in the truck, but
it is merely an estimate of how much cash the business will ultimately receive.
Similarly, on the cost side, when we use a depreciation method we are not really
reflecting the extent to which the asset is used up; we are reflecting a model of that
use. If the business has an asset, like a machine, that cost $140,000, the matching
concept says that the business should attribute some amount of the machine's cost to
each accounting period in which the machine is used.66 To make that calculation, the
business has to predict the useful life of the machine, predict its salvage value at the
end, and adopt a method of depreciation. Assume that the machine will last ten years
and will be saleable at that time for $20,000. That means $120,000 must be
depreciated and thus accounted for in each period. But that is not the end of the
matter. While the business could adopt a "straight line" depreciation method, in
which it takes $1,000 each month as an expense (note that this is not an expenditure
62This is consistent with Wittgenstein's assertion that the words and phrases constituting
language do not have inherent meanings, but do have significant meaning arising out of shared
"bedrock" beliefs. LUDwIG WITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 77, at 3 l e
(G.E.M. Anscombe, trans., 3d ed. 2001) (1953). See also Marian David, The Correspondence
Theory of Truth, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/.
631t is possible for a business to use "cash accounting" which measures cash receipt and
cash expenditure with a period, but that is not in conformity with GAAP. ANTHONY, HAWKINS
& MERCHANT, supra note 57, at 67-68.
64A blunter way of putting this is that "[n]et income is just an opinion, but cash flow is a
fact." PABLO FERNANDEZ, VALUATION METHODS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE CREATION 169
(2002). In another paper, the author notes the ways in which net income is subject to error or
manipulation: recognizing revenue too quickly or too slowly, capitalizing expenses, using
accruals and reserves, realizing extraordinary profits from investments, and outside the United
States, charging payments against the balance sheet and not going through the profit and loss
statement. Id. at 182.
6 5 ANTHONY, HAwKINS & MERCHANT, supra note 57, at 121-22.
661d. at 200.
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of cash) attributable to that period, it might also select an accelerated depreciation
method on the theory that the machine is more valuable when it is newer. In any
case:
[m]anagers, not being clairvoyant, cannot know in advance how long the
asset will last or what its residual value will be. Often they have no
scientific or strictly logical way of deciding the best depreciation method.
The amount of depreciation expense that results from these judgments is
therefore an estimate. Because of the arithmetic precision of the
calculations that take place after these judgments are made, the inexact
nature of depreciation expense is sometimes overlooked.67
2. The Gray Area Between Financial Models and Financial Games
It should now be apparent the extent to which the GAAP model can be played as
a game. Indeed, note the circularity. Financial reporting does not tell us what the
company is worth because it considers only the historical cost of assets and generally
not their market value. It does not tell us much about the prospects of the company.
The objective of the ordinary audit, according to the auditing profession, is "[t]o
express an opinion on the fairness, in all material respects, with which the financial
statements present financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or another comprehensive
basis of accounting." '6 In short, the object of the audit is to make sure that the
financial statements comport with the rules for financial statements. It is hardly
surprising then that financial reporting, which all but describes itself as a game
removed from any other underlying reality, comes to be viewed by the players as a
self-contained game and not a model.
Now consider the context of the game. Even though GAAP earnings are merely
a surrogate for value, they are an important surrogate. Wall Street analysts (if not the
company itself) create earnings targets, with attendant internal and external pressure
to meet those targets.69  Consider now several different circumstances."0  First,
knowing that current sales will not get to the earnings target, and feeling the pressure
from the CEO and CFO, one of the business managers takes advantage of the
arbitrary periods in financial reporting by actually holding back expenses (e.g.,
barring all travel for the remainder of the year) or actually bringing forward revenue
(e.g., "stuffing the channel" by offering extended credit terms for sales made to
customer in the present period).7' Second, the next quarter, even with manipulation
of the actual sales and actual expenses, the results come up to the CFO and are
disappointing. To improve the results, he takes two actions. He decides instead that
crib inventories, heretofore expensed, are really capital expenditures because they
are rarely used in the year in which the inventory is purchased. The CFO thus issues
671d. at 201.
68MICHAEL J. RAMOS, WILEY PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO GAAS 1, 2 (2007).
69Michael R. Young, The Origin of Financial Fraud, in ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES AND
FINANCIAL FRAUD 1 (Michael R. Young ed., 2000).
701d. at 6-10. I am indebted to this particular hypothetical which I have altered slightly.
711d at 7-8.
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the following statement: "Crib inventories are all capital expenditures." The
divisional controllers proceed to capitalize crib inventories (GAAP is complex, and
they apply the rules that come down from the corporate office). The effect, as the
CFO expected, is to increase earnings in the current period. He also concludes that
the company has been over-estimating the likelihood of non-payment, and so he
reverses a portion of the bad debt reserve (recall from above that five percent or so of
each sale goes into this reserve as a cushion, against which are to be charged real bad
debts).72 Third, in the next quarter, even after manipulating the actual sales and
costs, and even after the accounting adjustments of the previous quarter, the net
income numbers still fail to meet expectations. The CFO expects his announcement
to have a negative impact on the stock. So he takes out his pencil, erases the revenue
number, and writes in an amount that is twenty percent greater.73
721d. at 8-9. This practice is also known as "smoothing earnings," the practice by which
companies deliberately manipulate the revenues and costs in the various time periods buckets
so as to conform to earlier predictions, either from management or analysts. See Michael C.
Jensen, The Puzzling State of Low-Integrity Relations Between Managers and Capital
Markets, (Barbados Group, Working Paper No. 5-05, 2005) (PDF Files of Slides) available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-783604. Certainly before the Enron crisis, the rules of the manager-
analyst game rewarded present period "making the numbers" over long-term value, or at least
that is how companies perceived it. It was no treat to be in the R&D department in the fourth
quarter of a company having a bad year. Even without manipulation of the accounting, as
Jensen observes, there was a double-think rationalization (in my view) of perfectly legal, but
economically nonsensical trading of long-term value for short-term gain. Larry Cunningham
has recently reflected on this turn. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board
Expertise: Legal Implications of the Empirical Literature (The George Washington University
Law School Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 363, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=- 024261.
Jensen's other observation has to do with the manipulation of intra-corporate budgeting,
i.e., the gaming up and down of business in large and complex organizations. Business unit
controllers play games with the divisional management, and divisional controllers play games
with the corporate management. Michael Jensen, Paying People to Lie: The Truth About the
Budgeting System, 9 European Financial Management 379 (2003). According to Jensen:
People are taught to lie in these pervasive budgeting systems because if they tell the
truth they often get punished and if they lie they get rewarded. Once taught to lie in
this system people generally cannot help but extend that behavior to all sorts of other
relationships in the organization.
Id. at 380.
I am not convinced that people respond so directly to compensation that changing the pay
system would solve the problem, but I have no doubt that Jensen correctly identifies a
corrupting influence from a "top-down" imposed budgeting system. I have this intuition that
the gaming is more complex than merely economic. Once you set the rules of the game for
success-oriented people, success-oriented people want to win. Or they want to get an A and
not a C.
73See STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS 99, in CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A
FINANCIAL STATEMENT AuDrr, (2002) (summarized in RAMOS, supra note 68, at 55, which
defines fraud as "[a]n intentional act that results in a material misstatement in financial
statements that are the subject of an audit. The primary distinction between fraud and error is
whether the underlying action that causes the misstatement of the financial statements is
intentional or unintentional").
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What we have here is a continuum that ranges from the legal (but possibly
nonsensical) manipulation of the period accounting, to aggressive interpretation of
the GAAP reporting rules, and finally to an out-and-out lie. There is a rich literature
in sociology and criminology describing the process by which those in the business
might well rationalize from the legal manipulation to accounting manipulation to the
out-and-out lie.74 In their seminal article on juvenile delinquency, Gresham Sykes
and David Matza criticized the theoretical viewpoint that it was "based on the values
and norms of a deviant sub-culture in precisely the same way as law-abiding
behavior is based on the values and norms of the larger society .... "" Instead, they
observed that the delinquent more or less conforms to most of the rules of the social
order, and even recognizes his deviance from them. They note that social rules, even
among conforming individuals, are flexible: they are rarely universal or categorical
in all circumstances; they have a prima facie applicability but they are not binding in
every circumstance. Hence, the deviant may engage in a cognitive process of using
that flexibility as a basis for justifying or rationalizing conduct in a process Sykes
and Matza called "neutralization."76 There is, additionally, empirical support for
what one group of researchers of ethical behavior in business refers to as
"psychological patterns of behavior that could predict how natural patterns of human
judgment would lead to unethical behaviors."77 Not the least of these patterns is
"ethical fading" and self-deception.
I am particularly interested in the way linguistic communities serve as a resource
for neutralization and ethical self-deception. Paul Hirsch studied linguistic framing
as a way of adapting and orienting behavior within the context of hostile takeover
battles of the 1980s,78 He traced the linguistic framing of hostile takeovers as the
74See, e.g., EDWIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949); VICENZO RUGGIERO,
CRIME AND MARKETS: ESSAYS IN ANTI-CRIMINOLOGY (2000); Nancy Reichman, Insider
Trading, in 18 BEYOND THE LAW: CRIME IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (Michael Tonry &
Albert J. Reiss, Jr. ed., 1993); GILBERT GElS & EZRA STOTLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME:
THEORY AND RESEARCH (1980); NEAL SHOVER & JOHN PAUL WRIGHT, CRIMES OF PRIVILEGE:
READINGS IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2001).
75Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of
Delinquency, 22 AM. Soc. REv. 664, 666 (1957).
761d. at 666-67.
77Francesa Gino, Don A. Moore, & Max H. Bazerman, See No Evil: When We Overlook
Other People's Unethical Behavior, (Harvard Business School NOM, Working Paper No. 08-
045, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1079969. With respect to the issue of
accounting specifically, see, generally, Don A. Moore, P.E. Tetlock, L. Tanlu, & Max H.
Bazerman, Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction and
Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 10 (2006).
78Paul M. Hirsch, From Ambushes to Golden Parachutes: Corporate Takeovers as an
Instance of Cultural Framing and Institutional Integration, 91 AM. J. Soc. 800 (1986). My
personal experience comports with his linguistic analysis. When I left law firm practice after
thirteen years and took a position as an in-house lawyer for the automotive division of a huge
multi-national company, for a time I kept a log of curious jargon in my day-planner. To
"bubble up" meant that ideas had risen from the bottom of the hierarchy to the top; to "cascade
down" meant that ideas flowed in the other direction. A stack of PowerPoint slides for a
presentation was the "deck." A significant task was a "deliverable." And so on. Academia
has its own jargon, which I have also discovered. For additional variations on this theme,
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tactic came to be viewed as legitimate. When "corporate raiding" was still new,
disruptive, and ungentlemanly, the language and imagery was of epithets, street
fights, warfare, and "one-way stigmatization." As the practice became mainstream
and acceptable, the language also softened, shifting to more abstract, objective,
depersonalized imagery, like games.79 Hirsch's point was not that language caused
hostile takeovers, but that linguistic framing aided the participants in making sense
of the cultural change and adapting to it:8"
I consider ... [the flamboyant language of business takeovers] a specific
example of a more general phenomenon in which radical ideas, expressed
symbolically, have critically influenced organizational behavior. Again,
the reference is to the increasing dominance of the financial model and to
the profound implications that result from conceiving of the firm
primarily as an "asset." In an environment where management is
considered an abstract science governed by general principles, where
highly mobile managers are encouraged to remain emotionally aloof from
the firms that employ them, and where the constituency of the firm is
narrowing to exclude all but the investor, the absorption of such ideas as
"bottom line," "book values," "liquidity," and "price-earnings ratios"
reveals a continuing process of rationalization that requires sociocultural,
as well as economic, interpretations.8'
It seems to me that the image of aloof financial game-players, made twenty years
ago, has portended the conflation of financial models with financial games.
Let us return to a simple concept of the game. What precisely is the company's
obligation in presenting its financial statements? Is it to model the state of the
business? Or, in the spirit of the tautology, is it to present its financial statements?
Thinking about the financial statements as a game rather than a model may keep us
from out-and-out lying, just as the rules in baseball against corked bats may keep
players from using blatantly illegal equipment. But it is well-known that umpires in
baseball allow the "phantom double play" in which the second baseman or the
shortstop taking the throw at second base never actually steps on the base to make
the put-out (a concession no doubt to the fact that a runner is hurtling into the fielder
at a high rate of speed). We can rationalize the aggressive interpretation of the
accounting rules in the same way.
B. Models, Games, Explanatory Causes, and Attributive Causes
Imagine you are a visitor from outer space, knowing nothing of our culture, and
happened to land next to a cricket game (an American can experience this feeling by
sitting in a London pub with one playing on the telly, and conversely, non-Americans
need merely watch baseball). Having no predisposition, could you give a complete
reference TENBRUNSEL & MESSICK, supra note 5, at 226-28 (explaining how language
euphemisms facilitate unethical behavior).
79Hirsh, supra note 78, at 817-19 (see Table 3 summarizing the shift in "Language and
Ideology Characterizing the Hostile Tender Offer, as Innovation Diffused to Institutional Core
to Periphery").
8 Id. at 829.
81id. at 830.
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explanation of what was going on? Imagine instead you landed in Hong Kong next
to a park in which old men were practicing tai chi stances. I intend these thought
experiments to suggest that there is a significant difference between an observer
using models to make "scientific" causal explanations about the activity they may be
observing, on one hand, and understanding the causal reasons why the actors are
acting that way, on the other. Social science theorists are capable of not recognizing
the difference. Because I am concerned about lawyers mistaking very real game-
playing for modeling, and vice versa, doing the same thing in their practices, I want
to do some thinking about thinking.
Perhaps I can illustrate this in another way. I once worked for a CEO who,
outside the office, was a man of exquisite common sense, kindness, and values. For
some reason, many of those attributes, particularly the common sense, seemed to fall
away when he was in the office, meeting with his staff, and making decisions about
the business. For example, we were working on a deal that involved selling a portion
of the business, and the issue was maintaining confidentiality so that people in the
business would continue to focus on results, and not on their personal futures. The
problem, of course, is that it is exceedingly difficult to keep the fact of a business
divestiture secret. Even if people do not talk about it, there are patterns of activity
(certain groups of executives traveling at the same time to particular destinations,
particular conference rooms being taken, the way certain visitors to the offices are
greeted, various information requests, etc.) that make it clear to even the moderately
observant non-involved employee that something is going on. I suggested one day
that we should think of this in terms of a family situation in which the parents need to
talk about something but keep it from their naturally curious children. He shut me
down with words to the effect: "That's ridiculous; everybody here is an adult and
should be dealt with like an adult." I thought he was wrong to think that human
behavior changed merely because we were operating within a large business
corporation. I think now that it was a reflection of how modem professionals, and
the academies that train them, have assimilated the models of science and social
science to explain human behavior. 2
As my goal is to have us think about thinking, I want to unpack how we go about
explaining why things happen and, ultimately, to put that inquiry into the context of
models and games. We have already seen that the point of a model is to get to the
essence of something else, but with less complexity (to use computer lingo, in fewer
bits and bytes). Complexity theory says that if we proceed from an initial state, faced
with a succession of control parameters that portend different outcomes, the number
of possible outcomes increases exponentially. The game of chess is a good example.
The initial placement of the pieces is a steady state. There are only a finite number of
board positions after one move, or two, or three, or after forty, but they are increasing
exponentially. If chess were played randomly, no possible board position would be
more likely than any other after, say, five moves by each player. But in reality we
observe an organization process, by which some number of subsequent states appear
82See THOMAS L. HASKELL, OBJECTIVITY IS NOT NEUTRALITY 74 (1998) (professionalism is
a manifestation of a process "which Max Weber called 'rationalization,' the ominous tendency
in European civilization for impersonal calculations of least cost and maximum efficiency to
enter, and finally dominate, every sphere of life."); see also ThOMAS L. HASKELL, THE
EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (2000).
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more frequently than others.83 Organization means that the symmetry has been
broken by an agent external to the system.84 In chess, it is the fact that certain
opening moves and defenses have been developed over time." If all moves have the
same probability of occurring without external limitations, then all outcomes (i.e.,
successive states) are equally probable, and complexity constitutes "the impossibility
of predicting which one is the state we will observe at the end of the chain of
bifurcations."86
Science (and social science) works the other way, and looks to explain how things
got to be the way they are now. It does this by creating a model, namely, a system
that processes external events by the application of the rules within the model.87 We
often observe, however, that a number of competing models may be constructed to
explain a particular state. The question is how we choose among them as the most
appropriate.8 And it is still unresolved how scientific explanation is transferable, if
at all, from one level of complexity to another, other than by metaphor. At their best,
explanatory models not only strip away all that is irrelevant (by a process that in itself
83Arecchi, supra note 37, at 53-54.
4Id. at 54-55.
8 5A contract can be a model that seeks to predict future events and to prescribe
consequences if those events occur, and I have analogized this in the past to writing a contract
that requires predicting moves and counter-moves in a chess game. I once negotiated a lease
that dealt with the following situation. Tenant A leased commercial space from Landlord B,
but wanted to downsize. Landlord B had two alternatives, existing Building 1 with another
tenant that would need to terminate early and move out, and a proposed Building 2 that could
be built in twelve months if necessary. Tenant A was willing to extend its lease with Landlord
B in consideration of the downsizing, and Landlord B wanted, if possible, to avoid having to
build Building 2. We negotiated a contract that modeled a progression from a steady state of
Tenant A resident in its present space to six possible outcomes: Tenant A would move to
Building 1 within nine months; Tenant A would move to Building 1 within twelve months;
Tenant A would move to Building 2 within twenty-one months, with a reduction of rent on the
present space; Tenant A would move to Building 1 or Building 2 within twenty-seven months
with a similar rent reduction; Tenant A would be permitted to terminate its entire lease and
find a new landlord within twenty-seven months; or Tenant A would remain in the present
space.
The control parameters in the lease had to do with Landlord B's willingness to commit to
the alternative space as of certain dates. The lease predicted a series of if-then circumstances:
if Landlord B could commit to Building 1 by a certain date, then the lease would be amended
to provide for that move; if Landlord B could not, then there were possible later dates, or the
possibility of constructing Building 2. At each step, the possible outcomes in the real world
grew exponentially, but the flow chart implicit in the contract charted only a select few.
Indeed, at some point, the flow chart became too complex and the solution at that point was
merely to declare a breach rather than to propose another consequence.
86Arecchi, supra note 37, at 55.
871d. at 56.
881 assume that all of the models predict equally well at their respective levels of
complexity. The question is not the better model, i.e., the better predictor, at the same level of
complexity, but what model is more appropriate to explanation at our particular level of
inquiry.
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is mysterious), but tell us something in a language that is appropriate for the
complexity of the thing being modeled.
We can see this in examples from natural science and from the social science of
history. As to the former, a dog is made up of organs, which are made up of cells,
which are in turn made up of molecules. Models within the science of cell dynamics,
cytology, only serve to explain what the cells are doing; models within the language
of physiology only serve to explain what the organs are doing. But describing a
dog's behavior either in the language of cytology or physiology may not be helpful to
a scientist in animal psychology.89
Modeling is more than mere simplification. It requires a language in which the
simplified essence can be related, whether the language is computational or not.
"[D]oing science is ... making it possible to encode our perceptions into a suitable
language, not just building theoretical models to uncover rules and make predictions
with regard to [a phenomenon]."9 ' When we observe the world as a matter of natural
and social science, sometimes we can apply computational models and sometimes we
cannot.9 Suppose we want to solve a problem, like dog aggression. The root cause
could be one of psychology, physiology or cytology. Scientists at each level avoid
the imprecision of ordinary language.92 They substitute quantitative formulae. Or, to
put it another way, ordinary words are "polysemic"; they have a range of meanings
without the precision of the symbols of logic or mathematics.93 The measuring
apparatus, or language sequence, or formula, is the process of developing theory in
science: the scientist links and explains the observable data by way of a model, and
the model's value is whether it accurately predicts results when applied to similar
data.
Douglas Hofstadter talks about this issue in terms of the ways of describing
patterns at different levels of granularity and complexity that make the description
890ne theory is that complexity in nature arises from the observation that the language
sequences, or models, used to describe behavior within micro elements like molecules and
cells are misplaced when applied to describe macro systems which arise from the micro levels
that constituted the building blocks of the system. The precise language of a particular science
"[ius sufficient for a limited description of the event, but only from a narrow point of view.
Even though we believe that humans are made of atoms, the affections that we measure in
atomic physics are insufficient to make predictions on human behavior." Arecchi, supra note
37, at 51-52.
9Id. at 46.
91Traub, supra note 37, at 39. ("Science certainly uses mathematics, but science is also
very different from mathematics. Science is about understanding the universe and everything
in it. . . . [A]t least on the face of it, there are no mathematical models that formalize the
relevant aspects of the world, within which [scientific] questions can be asked.").
92See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (2001); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
The Bewitchment of Intelligence: Language and Ex Post Illusions of Intention, 78 TEMP. L.
REv. 99 (2005).
93Arecchi, supra note 37, at 49. "Thus, the flow of scientific discourse consists of sharp,
necessary connections among point like objects of different semantic spaces, corresponding to
different measurements .... It means that the scientific language is free from interpretational
ambiguities." Id. at 51.
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comprehensible or meaningful.94 Some phenomena would be incomprehensible at
microscopic levels of reduction:
The point is that one gets into very hot water if one goes the fully
reductionist route; not only do all the objects in "the system" become
microscopic and uncountably numerous, but also the system itself grows
beyond bounds in space and time and becomes, in the end, the entire
universe taken over all of time. There is no comprehensibility left, since
everything is shattered into a trillion trillion trillion invisible pieces that
are scattered hither and yon. Reductionism is merciless.95
But scientists do talk to each other and decide, for example, whether the
best explanation of the dog aggression comes from the models of
psychology, physiology, or cytology. If they stick to the precise language
of their respective disciplines, they are incapable of communicating
except by metaphor in ordinary language. But they do talk to each other,
and it is an exercise in meta-science, whereby they think about selecting
the suitable model for the scientific hypothesis itself.96
94DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, I AM A STRANGE Loop 24-50 (2007).
951d. at 48.
961d. at 58-59. There is a rich literature on theory selection, starting with the somewhat
post-modem approach to the fact-value distinction derived from Hilary Putnam's critique of
the philosophy of science. As Professor Steven Ball summarizes Putnam, "the so-called
'objective facts' of science are infused with 'cognitive values' (e.g., theoretical simplicity,
coherence, etc.) pertaining to practical human interests in scientific theorizing, and others refer
similarly to 'pragmatic' or 'epistemic' values or 'virtues' connecting to the explanatory,
predictive, or problem-solving, etc., functions of science." Stephen W. Ball, Facts, Values,
and Interpretation in Law: Jurisprudence from Perspectives in Ethics and Philosophy of
Science, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 15, 30 (1993) (citing HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND
HISTORY (1981)). Moral relativists would like to use Putnam's point about the infusion of
cognitive "values" to suggest there is no objectivity in physical science; a fortiori, how could
there be objectivity in moral philosophy? Id. at 32. 1 suggest there may be instances in which
values and desires affect theory, but the real issue is the pre-cognitive, or abductive,
disposition to order perception in particular ways. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 28. Hence,
Professor Ball notes "Putnam's most recent formulation of scientific 'realism' denies not that
there is a theory-independent reality, but only that there is one uniquely correct theoretical
'description' or 'version' of it." Ball, supra, at 33.
Another approach asks the question, "Whence comes the idea for the hypothesis?" Some
cognitive scientists look to pattern recognition and analogy. See generally supra note 2.
Perhaps the best we can do is to suggest that the source of a scientific hypothesis taps into our
pre-cognitive ability to see patterns and to analogize from them. Even John Searle reached the
end of his ability to explain this:
It just seems to be a fact about our mental capacities that we are able to interpret
certain sorts of metaphor without the application of any underlying "rules" or
"principles" other than the sheer ability to make certain associations. I don't know
any better way to describe these abilities than to say that they are nonrepresentational
mental capacities.
JOHN SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY 1, 149 (Cambridge University Press 1983), quoted in Johnson,
supra note 2, at 28. Scott Brewer used the term "rational force" to assess the persuasiveness
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All of this deals with the selection of an appropriate scientific explanatory cause.
The issue is similar in social science, but more complex because we want to explain
the behavior of humans who have intention and purpose, and act within context. The
question is the extent to which we can establish law-like ("nomological") regularities
in human behavior. The principal advocate of the idea that history could be reduced
to a series of universal (and scientific) causal "covering laws" was the philosopher of
science Carl Hempel.97  Any lawyer will appreciate one philosopher's
characterization of the debate:
Suppose someone asks me why I struck an old man in the street. The
answer "Because electrical impulses from my brain precipitated muscular
contractions, and this resulted in my hand making contact with his head"
would be absurd and impertinent, however accurate as a causal
explanation. The answer "Because he annoyed me" may be inadequate in
that it gives no good reason, but it is certainly not absurd.
9 8
Or a parent asking a teenager who used the car last evening why it would not start
the next morning would consider a lengthy explanation of the physics of a cracked
radiator to be equally impertinent; the meaningful answer was that the teenager
forgot to put the car in the garage on a sub-zero night.99
of legal reasoning methods, and explains the difference between deduction and induction, on
one hand, and abduction, on the other. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics,
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARv. L. REV. 925,
945-49 (1996). The idea is that the most irrefutable arguments are those based on deductive
logic, in which conclusions must necessarily follow if the premises are true. Inductive
arguments rely on the predictive power of the imputed pattern, akin to rule-following. We
induce a pattern or rule in the empirical data, and predict the next instantiation will follow the
rule. We cannot know this necessarily, but there is substantial decision-making force.
Abductive reasoning is the more mysterious process by which we derive the hypothesis that is
the basis of inductive reasoning. We intuit a pattern, posit it as the working rule (the
hypothesis), and then test it. Finally there is reasoning by analogy, in which we take source
and target, and infer that if source and target are similar in premises A and B, and the analogy
source has conclusion C, then the target also ought to have conclusion C. Yet most thinking
within legal scholarship about analogical reasoning has to do with the rational force of
assertions or propositions, and not the "deeper" question of whether the force of the analogy is
such that the analogical form (or model) takes on independent "beingness."
97THOMAS L. HASKELL, OBJECTIVITY IS NOT NEUTRALITY: EXPLANATORY SCHEMES IN
HISTORY, 12-24 (1998).
98Roger Scruton, Kant, in GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS, 69-70 (1982).
99HASKELL, supra note 97, at 17. Other philosophers make the same point. Joseph Raz
explains this in terms of "transitivity." Normative reasons are transitive. If one exercises
well, one will be healthier. If one uses a trainer, one will exercise well. Therefore, applying
the transitive principle, if one uses a trainer, one will be healthier. But descriptive reasons, or
causes, are not transitive, and hence meaningless when applied at the wrong levels. The
repulsion between particles of the same charge at an atomic level has no coherent meaning as
applied to the repulsion between human beings or their nation-states, except perhaps by
metaphor. Joseph Raz, Reasons: Explanatory and Normative (Univ. of Oxford Faculty of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 13/2007, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-999869. Julrgen Habermas makes the same point. JURGEN
HABERMAS, ON THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1-16 (1996).
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To seek regular and invariant causes in the nature of a scientific model (i.e., what
Hempel called "covering laws") is possibly to ignore the context in which the
activity takes place, and the common sense attribution of the causal reasons why
something happened, in a way that parallels the natural scientists need to find the
appropriate model for descriptive explanation. As the historian Thomas Haskell
observes:
[t]he crux of the misunderstanding into which historians have been led by
[Hempel's] covering law thesis . . . is the notion that there is only one
form of causal reasoning, the nomological-deductive. There is, as Weber
knew, another mode of causal reasoning, the attributive mode, which we
take so much for granted that we fail to recognize it for what it is: the very
bone and sinew of which common sense is constituted." °
Instead of trying to explain cricket or tai chi, suppose we are trying to explain
what the parties meant when they used particular words in a contract. That is the
stuff of everyday contract interpretation, something in which lawyers and judges
engage all the time. Two of the pre-eminent social scientists of the law took on that
challenge, using an economic model to find a rigorous way of setting the legal rules.
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott advocated the following rule of contract
interpretation, at least for contracts between relatively sophisticated businesses: go
by the plain meaning of the document, because business parties would choose
Willistonian formalism over UCC-style contextualism as the mode of contract
interpretation."' I do not criticize their choice of legal default rule; rather the route
they take is one that elevates deduction and universal law over common sense, and
hence is entitled to some skepticism.1"2
100HABERMAS, supra note 99, at 16.
0'0 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541 (2003). This is really an empirical assertion, but Schwartz and Scott arrive at
the conclusion as a matter of deduction from a number of assumptions that are the basis of the
model. Because individuals and small businesses might not be rational (and therefore want
solely to maximize joint surplus when contracting), the model only applies to relatively
sophisticated businesses. These are defined as entities in the corporate form and having five
or more employees, limited partnerships, or professional partnerships, such as law or
accounting firms. Id. at 545.
1021 have taken courage from the example of Thomas Haskell's review of Time on the
Cross, by Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, one of the most hotly debated
historical studies of the last forty years. ROBERT FOGEL & STANLEY ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE
CROSS, THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974). Applying a measure called
"the index of total productivity," a ratio of input to output, Fogel and Engerman argued that
slave labor was more efficient than free labor. The crux of Haskell's review was that the
index measured productivity in dollars rather than units, and accordingly as much influenced
by consumer behavior as producer behavior. Nevertheless, Fogel and Engerman concluded,
largely without evidence, the gap in efficiency was due to superior management of planters
and black labor. Haskell's review in the New York Review of Books began with the following
disclaimer:
The carnival of publicity attending the publication of Time on the Cross suggests that
the authors ... desire an audience embracing not only econometric historians but all
reasonable people. I am not an econometric historian or a specialist in the history of
slavery, but I am a reasonable man and, as such, entitled to judge the plausibility of the
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Schwartz and Scott argue that the legal model of contract interpretation should
derive from an economic model which maps on a linguistic model which bears some
relationship to a transaction between the parties. The critical link here is whether
you can map an economic model onto a linguistic model. The model concludes as
between business firms: (1) the parties really do want the court to interpret the
contract in a way that maximizes joint surplus over the individual party's share of the
splitting of the surplus (i.e., the negotiated price), and (2) in the long run, interpretive
mistakes by courts even out, and using a minimum of evidence beyond the text is
cheaper, so parties would prefer plain meaning textualism on the assumption that
unbiased courts get to the correct answer about the parties' intention most of the
time.
The model is based on a number of assumptions about the way firms do business
that are open to debate. First, the authors contend that firms are not risk-averse like
individuals, so money equals utility and each marginal dollar is valued as much as
the last." 3 This is to neutralize the theoretical and empirical observation of
behavioral psychology and economics that individuals are indeed risk averse-they
would prefer $1,000 to a one in ten chance of receiving $10,000.'" Second,
shareholders and managers each want to maximize profits, and even if managers are
diverting shareholder wealth to themselves, they would still not want to degrade the
quality of the contracts. 105 Third, corporate executives go to business school and
learn how to make optimizing rather than cognitively erroneous decisions, and to
perform complex game-theoretic reasoning. 6 Fourth, optimizing parties who do not
make cognitive errors will want to maximize joint gains at the negotiating stage, and
will not behave strategically so as to injure joint surplus creation in the interest of
increasing their own profit.0 7
All of these assumptions require a leap of faith, and the last in particular. The
concept of joint surplus (which the parties divide into consumer surplus and supplier
surplus by setting the price) is an economic abstraction, albeit a powerful and useful
one when used to give an abstract and universal sense of why transactions occur at
all, but far less so when used as a tool to measure the value of the transactions to the
authors' argument .... The most troublesome phase of any quantitative study is the
translation of numerical procedures into plain English. In their research and
calculations, Fogel and Engerman may have considered all the objections raised
below. But even if their conclusions turn out to be procedurally well-founded, their
presentation still fails, for they have not exposed to the reader's view any process of
reasoning adequate to justify their conclusions.
Thomas L. Haskell, Were Slaves More Efficient? Some Doubts about Time on the Cross, N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 19, 1974, at 38, reprinted in HASKELL, supra note 97, at 31. Neither am
I an economist, but I am a lawyer and a reasonable person, and feel entitled to judge the
plausibility of the assumptions that underlie the economic formulae presented by Professors
Schwartz and Scott.
'
03Schwartz & Scott, supra note 101, at 541 n.16.
104RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 10-11 (6th ed. 2003).
105Schwartz & Scott, supra note 101, at 550-51.
'°6. at 551 n.17.
1071d. at 552 ("On a deeper view, however, one can see that sophisticated parties at the
negotiating stage prefer to write contracts that maximize total benefits.").
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parties. Let us take an example. Seller is a manufacturer of brakes for cars and
trucks. It divides the business into the car unit and the truck unit. Seller wants to
sell the truck unit as a going concern. That means all the assets and liabilities related
to it, including its goodwill, will be sold. Seller thinks the business is worth $300,
and would take any price in excess of that. Buyer wants to buy a truck brake
business. Buyer thinks Seller's unit is worth $1,000, and would be willing to pay
any price up to that. There is a potential economic surplus of $700. Seller and
Buyer do not know how the other values the business. Buyer makes an offer of
$400, which means that it would capture $600 of whatever surplus there is. Seller
counters with an offer of $700, which means it would capture $400 of whatever
surplus is out there. They compromise at $500, and this has been an efficient deal.
They have created $700 of surplus, of which Seller took $200, and Buyer took
$500.108
Why would Seller and Buyer look to maximizing joint surplus rather than merely
taking more of a smaller surplus? Schwartz and Scott move past this quickly,
offering no empirical evidence that they do, perhaps because maximizing joint
surplus under the foregoing hypothetical would mean the parties actually knew how
much each other valued the assets. That is the assumption of perfect information,
required for rational actors, but so unusual in the real world that the assumption of
asymmetric information is one of the bases of behavioral economics. °" Moreover,
the conclusion that parties want to maximize joint surplus requires the following
additional assumptions. First, if each party's share of the surplus were to be set
exogenously (i.e., not by the parties themselves in the negotiation), then strategic
behavior would be useless and rational parties would not engage in it."' Second, the
parties' bargaining share are in fact set exogenously as a function of the parties'
relative patience (in turn a function of the party's access to capital) and the
"disagreement point," neither of which the parties can change. Hence, rational
bargaining firms realize that they cannot do anything about either patience or
disagreement point. They therefore realize and accept that their share of the
maximum surplus is fixed before they ever sign the contract. So, the deductive logic
of the model says, because that is the only way they make more money, their
contracting behavior must be geared to maximizing the size of the pie."'
Now we move to the second prong of the argument-that risk neutral parties
desiring to maximize joint surplus actually, subjectively, in their own minds (or
would if they thought about it), want the court to restrict its inquiry to the plain
meaning of the text. Let us continue with the brake business hypothetical. Having
agreed on a price for the car brake business, Seller and Buyer send their lawyers off
to write the contract. There are assets and liabilities that are purely part of the truck
108This is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. POSNER, supra note 104, at 13.
109 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The
Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. Soc. 548 (1981). For another critique of the
assumption of the parties' knowledge of each other's expectations, see W. Brian Arthur, The
End of Certainty in Economics, in J.H. CLIPPINGER,THE BIOLOGY OF BUSINESS (1999).
"
0Schwartz & Scott, supra note 101, at 552-53.
'Id. at 553-54. Schwartz and Scott contend further that these assumptions hold even if
the parties do not know precisely how much bargaining power they have. Id. at 554 n.24.
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business, and the lawyers list them. But there are also lots of assets that are shared
between truck and car, and again, they try to divide them up on a list. But they need
a default to describe those assets that they have not considered specifically. That is
because they want as complete a contract as possible. So they say in the contract that
Seller is selling Buyer all the assets primarily related to the truck business, except
those specifically listed otherwise in the agreement.
It turns out later that there is an asset they forgot to list, the Globulator. In terms
of time of usage it was used exactly 50% for the car business which is not being sold,
and 50% for the truck business which is being sold. The volume of parts was 51%
truck and 49% car. The dollar value of parts was 49% truck and 51% car. Buyer
realizes that it needs another Globulator, and they cost $100 at retail, so now the
value of the deal to the Buyer has been reduced by that much. Seller has quite a few
Globulators, and values them at $50, but is not in the charity business. Buyer sues
Seller for $100.
Now the court has to apply the plain meaning rule to the interpretation of
"primarily used in" to the Globulator. What is the correct answer in the contract
interpretation game with respect to the Globulator? The facts show a dead heat. If
"primarily related to" means greater than 50%, Seller wins and has no obligation to
transfer the Globulator. If "primarily related to" means 50% or greater, Buyer wins
and gets the machine. Somebody has to win. Not to decide is to decide.
How do Schwartz and Scott propose that courts deal with the interpretation
problem? Their model first presumes the existence of a correct answer within the
language of the contract." 2 But Schwartz and Scott acknowledge that words can be
vague or ambiguous." 3  Nevertheless, the model supposes that the contract is
complete in the sense that the writing in fact expresses the parties' solution to the
contracting problem of defining the assets that were sold."' Indeed, the model
assumes that, if the contract were not the optimum drafting solution to maximizing
joint surplus, the parties would have continued to invest in making it clearer.' The
parties had to be aware, however, because of the possibility of vagueness of
language, that their meaning might not always be transparent to a later interpreter." 6
Thus, there is a possibility that the court's interpretation will deviate from the correct
answer.
Schwartz and Scott thus make the eminently reasonable suggestion that the court
should adopt the interpretive protocol the parties would want as most likely to arrive
at the correct answer. Indeed, they note that the court will frustrate this if it does
"121d. at 568. Schwartz and Scott do not say, but I am inferring that even if the parties
cannot agree on the correct meaning of "primarily related to" because they are now both
opportunists, the court can feel assured that they really intended the words to mean that which
would maximize joint surplus.
131d. at 570. Schwartz and Scott understand vagueness as common in the sense that the
set of objects to which a word applies is rarely delineated with absolute precision. Id.
114Id. at 573. Or, in my more colloquial rendition, evoking Ronald Reagan, there is a pony
in that manure pile.
1l5Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 574 (2003).
11Id at 573.
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anything other than ascertain the solution the parties actually adopted. The choice as
to interpretive protocol really turns on the breadth of the evidentiary base that will be
used. In short, as a default, would the parties want the court to be a Willistonian
formalist or a Corbinian contextualist? Schwartz and Scott opt for the former,
concluding that typical firms prefer courts to interpret contracts on as narrow an
evidentiary base as possible, and the most significant component of that base is the
written contract.
The justification of contract textualism requires an economic formula that takes
into account risk to the parties, benefits, and the costs of resolution. Schwartz and
Scott assume there is a direct relationship between the amount of evidence on which
the interpretation is based and the likelihood of reaching that single correct answer.
The evidence base ranges from the minimum (defined as the written contract, a
performance narrative, a dictionary, and the interpreter's knowledge of the world)
and expressed in formula as Bmin. Letting in course of dealing, course of
performance, usage of trade, negotiations, and pre-contract documents extends the
evidentiary base to Bmax. Academic contextualists prefer Bmax because the court is
more likely to find the correct answer.
Schwartz and Scott conclude, based on their model, business people would prefer
formalism, or Bmin. Recall that Schwartz and Scott have assumed a relationship
between the breadth of the evidentiary base and the probability of a correct result in a
specific dispute. They posit two different situations: first, a model that presumes a
continuous relationship between the degree of interpretive error and the amount of
the payoff, and second, a model in which the outcome is discontinuous. A
continuous payoff dispute would occur, for example, if the interpretation involved a
clause under which a seller had a duty to prepare certain machines before sale. The
greater the duty the court finds in the language, the greater the payoff to the buyer.
Our brake business example is a discontinuous payoff. The Seller either wins or
loses and any interpretation error gives either the Seller or the Buyer a 100% payoff.
But I believe the Schwartz and Scott rationale for the continuous payoff is in fact the
one that applies to my hypothetical." 7
The Schwartz and Scott model translates contract textualism into a formula."'
When translated back into plain English, the formula says that if there is a dispute
over the meaning of the machine preparation clause, what the buyer can expect as his
judicially determined share of the surplus, given the minimum evidentiary base used
by the court, is the correct interpretation modified by some probability of error or
variance from the correct interpretation. Think of an x-axis with zero in the middle,
negative numbers representing pro-seller judicial error running to the left and
positive numbers representing pro-buyer judicial error running to the right. The
"correct interpretation" would be zero, as long as the court is not biased. Assuming
the court is unbiased, it would be equally likely to err for (i.e., reach a result in the
positive numbers) or against (i.e., reach a result in the negative numbers) the buyer.
"That is because, in my hypothetical, there are only two possible results. Schwartz and
Scott devote a portion of their argument to showing how even if there are three possible
discontinuous results, say two favoring Seller and one favoring Buyer, the parties would still
want the court to use a textualist approach. I do not need to address that argument.
"'Id. at 575-76. The formula is E[sb(i)JBmin] = sb(i*) + 9.
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Schwartz and Scott contend that the model, under the assumptions previously
stated, establishes that business firms would prefer the minimum evidentiary base, or
textualism. It assumes that, as the evidentiary base approaches the maximum, the
likelihood of interpretation error approaches zero. Recall again the assumption that
business firms are risk neutral. Risk neutral parties are indifferent to the risk that the
court is wrong in any specific case, as long as in the long run, the zero (or mean) on
our axis really represents the right answer. Risk neutral parties would thus want to
make the interpretation on the minimum evidentiary base unless it would be costless
to widen the base. Since trials are expensive, risk neutral firms are textualists, at
least as to typical cases, because it is satisfactory if courts get interpretive disputes
correctly decided on average." 9 Finally, as noted above, parties writing contracts
will invest resources until the writing is sufficiently clear, in an objective sense, so
that the mean of possible judicial interpretations is the correct one. The parties are
willing to allow error as long as it is not biased error.
The irony here is that I am as willing as Schwartz and Scott to advocate
formalism. Schwartz and Scott are not satisfied, as I would be, with saying,
"formalism and plain meaning are the rules of the ex post contract interpretation
litigation game; if they fail to match up to what the parties actually wanted, well, you
pay your money and you take your chances." For economists, it is not enough that
the ex post game have an object of "finding the correct answer to the interpretation
problem." To justify the game economically, it is important to conclude that the
game actually models what the parties wanted-that is, that the parties themselves
actually had a right answer. Schwartz and Scott want the rules of the ex post game
to map on what the parties really wanted ex ante.'
The problem, of course, is that the mapping comes out wrong in my hypothetical,
which I contend is far more typical of the ordinary contract interpretation dispute.
We can imagine in our hypothetical the court restricting itself to the contract, a
dictionary, and the facts above. The word "primarily" means "for the most part.''
In that case, "primarily related to" must mean a smidgen more than fifty percent, so
any asset shared absolutely equally is not primarily related to the business, and hence
stays with Seller. But note at least two problems in dealing with the assumption that
the parties were maximizing joint surplus. Under the plain meaning of the
"primarily related to," Buyer loses, and the joint surplus of the deal turns out to have
been only $600, not $700, of which Seller took $200 and Buyer took $400. Given
that Seller only values the Globulator at $50, joint surplus maximizing parties must
have intended that "primarily" did not have its plain meaning, because if Buyer wins,
the loss of joint surplus is only $50, not $100. Second, because the parties are
naturally opportunistic, if the facts had been changed so that assets primarily related
to the non-sold business were excluded, then the parties would have simply taken
opposite sides on the argument, but this time consistent with the joint surplus
maximization.
"
9 d. at 576-77. A corollary to this is that in "bet the ranch" cases, one party may want a
broader evidentiary base on the thesis that the court is more likely to get it right. Id. at 577.
120This, of course, assumes that the contract being interpreted was itself not wholly or
partly a game or a thing, but purely a linguistic model of, and about, what the parties actually
wanted.
12 1MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 923 (10th ed. 2002).
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Does the correct answer in the contract interpretation game have anything to do
with what the parties were actually intending when they wrote the provision? I
suspect not. To the extent my casual and personal empiricism is relevant, I have
negotiated many deals, and I cannot remember ever thinking about total surplus at
all, much less first. Why? It is because almost none of the perfect world
assumptions of the economic model ever appear in pure form in the real world being
modeled. We rarely have real auctions to achieve real allocative efficiency. We
have no idea what the joint surplus is. In the real world, I cannot imagine the parties
ever coming close to thinking strategic negotiation is meaningless, and that the
whole game in writing that provision on "primarily related to" was to increase the
joint surplus from the original deal.
In their desire to find a universal and nomological basis for contract formalism, it
seems to me that Schwartz and Scott have committed the covering law error.
Understanding cause-and-effect in the thing-like game of contract creation requires
an exploration of attributive cause-what were the parties doing, what were they
thinking about? It is wholly legitimate to use the nomological rules of economics to
set legal default rules. But trying to use them to understand or explain what the
parties were doing has about the same sensibility as a physicist analyzing the cause
of the pipes bursting in a northern Minnesota home on the night of January 15: the
reduction of kinetic energy in the water led to crystalline ice formation, which
increased the volume, which led to an increase in pressure beyond the metallurgical
bursting point of the copper. The rest of us know the real cause-the furnace went
out on a sub-zero night.
The irony is that I agree with the textualist default rule Schwartz and Scott
propose. But almost everything they assume for the model justifying the rule fails to
reflect what is actually happening. Contracting parties, even when they are business
executives, full of intention and purpose and their special mix of ambition and
hubris, cannot be the subject of a universal nomological model, and certainly not at
the level of abstraction proposed by Schwartz and Scott.
A better way to view the entire hypothetical is not as the subject of a scientific
model in which we posit a single explanatory theory of cause-and-effect (i.e.,
rational greed), but as a series of games in which we need to understand cause-and-
effect at a different attributive level. Indeed, the parties have proceeded from game
to game to game to game, and the rules continue to change along the way. In the ex
ante contract writing game, it may well be that the parties reached the limit of their
ability to model reality in the language game. In the larger ex ante contract
negotiation game, the contract language itself may not have been a model of
anything, but in fact a dummy provision inserted without meaning so that the deal
would close.
Ex post contract interpretation litigation is another game, and the only question is
how we set the rules. We can set the rules narrowly, as formalists, or we can set
them broadly, as contextualists, but those will be the rules of the game. Lawyers
writing business contracts will know that those are going to be the rules. But there is
no reason to suppose that there are universal rules in every game. Even if contract
formalism works as it does in the litigation game, suggesting that a rule is justified
because it models what the parties actually wanted in the negotiation game is a
category error of causal reasoning-mistaking scientific explanation for attributive
(Vol. 56:613
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cause. As Thomas Haskell says of Hempel's claims of the supremacy of covering
law explanations, they "collapse without the prop of radical abstraction."''
Though it is hardly pernicious and is probably intentional, Schwartz and Scott
have been co-opted by the linguistic community of economists. In short, explaining
the parties' intent by a set of universal economic laws flies in the face of the
common sense attribution of meaning; it flies only with the prop of radical
abstraction. Academic lawyers have the luxury of proposing universal covering laws
as though their model were the actual game; there is little real world effect in
mistaking explanatory cause for attributive common sense cause. But practicing
lawyers do not have that luxury. They need to understand why events occurring in
the world appear to be causally related in model-like explanatory contexts, as well as
in game-like attributive contexts.
IV. THE GAME-MODEL CONFUSION: A PRAGMATIC ONTOLOGY FOR LAWYERS AND
ETHICISTS
So where does this all get us? I do not expect working lawyers (or law
professors) to have my particular interest in theory about thinking. I do, however,
believe, they need to think about thinking. Hence, my conclusion is that there is a
need for some pragmatic ontology, even if we do not use the fancy words to describe
it. In this section, I want to address the pragmatic issues, and that will suffice for
most readers. In the section that follows, I will philosophize, place my views within
the context of the intellectual history of this issue, and suggest why, as legal
pedagogues, we ought to think just a little about the theory.
While learning to think like a lawyer may be a worthy goal for a law student,
actually doing so may be problematic once she graduates and starts advising business
clients. The distinctions between models and games, and between explanatory and
attributive causes, is a helpful way of considering two different kinds of problems
facing lawyers. The first is a kind of benign co-optation or neutralization into
thinking like a lawyer to the extent that it renders the lawyer far less effective as an
adviser, tactician, or strategist. The second is far more serious. Lawyers are
increasingly called on to be compliance officers or business ethicists, and not seeing
co-optation or neutralization in terms of the games and models of business can have
life and career altering effects.
A. Games, Models, and Missing the Point
There is certainly a sense among business clients that lawyers are not always, but
often can be, wholly clueless about the business, rather than the legal, dynamics of a
transaction. Lawyers see the contract as a thing in itself designed to manage an
uncertain future; business people object when forcing the present deal game into the
lawyer's contract model impedes closing the deal. "The tension between lawyers
and business people is part of the folklore. Lawyers complain that business people
do not plan carefully enough against future contingencies; business people complain
that lawyers' caution interferes with valuable deals."' 2 3 Jim Freund of Skadden,
122HASKELL, supra note 97, at 17.
123Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation
of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 91, 126 n.102 (2000).
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Arps, one of the most thoughtful and prolific writers on transactional practice,
observed similarly in quoting an advertisement for a book on doing deals:
Have you ever had a deal blow up solely because of an attorney? ....
[Y]ou must face the reality that attorneys have been, are, and,
unfortunately, probably always will be a major obstacle in just about
every significant business transaction that takes place .. . . [Y]ou must
develop specific techniques ... for protecting your flanks from the deal-
killing expertise of the other side's attorney.'24
Is a contract (particularly a complex contract) a model of the deal, or is it a game
in itself? In the famous case Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,2' a lawyer's failure to see
the difference was a key turning point in the trial. After long negotiations, Pennzoil
(represented by Arthur Liman) thought it was acquiring Getty Oil (whose board was
represented by Martin Lipton), based on what was little more than a handshake
between the lawyers.' 26 Getty and Pennzoil did not have a signed writing, definitive
or not, because: (1) at least one side believed its handshake was its bond, (2) the
directors and lawyers were exhausted after all-night sessions, (3) the lawyers
working on documents through another all-night session after the board meeting
were not sure what happened in the Getty Oil board meeting, and (4) in the flurry of
the conclusion of the board meeting, nobody from Getty Oil stopped to sign the five
page memorandum of understanding already signed by Getty Oil's major
shareholder and the chairman of Pennzoil.'27 Texaco swooped in and took the deal
away from Pennzoil. At trial, Lipton testified that there was no deal because "in his
opinion [Getty Oil] could never have completed the Pennzoil deal without hiring
lawyers who specialized in complex oil-and-gas transactions.' '2 8  In cross-
examination, Joe Jamail, on behalf of Pennzoil, exploited the fact that Lipton (and,
by proxy, Texaco) explained away the apparent lack of honor by the fact that there
was no written agreement. 29 Lipton was focused on winning the contract game, and
failed to see that the contract was merely a model for the underlying reality of the
transaction. The jury, not persuaded, awarded Pennzoil $10 billion in compensatory
and punitive damages.
The issue was misdirected casual reasoning. A transactional lawyer confused the
contract as a model of the deal with the reality of the deal, thought of the contract as
the game, and ignored the broader context (or game) within which the contract was
to model an understanding. Lipton's testimony was a perfectly acceptable
nomological-deductive explanation of the lack of a binding contract at one level of
124JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER (1975), at 4 n.1. See also Mike France, A
Compelling Case for Lawyer-CEOs, Bus. WK., Dec. 13, 2004, at 88 ("Business attorneys are
often considered the 'vice-presidents of No,' says Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, associate dean of
executive programs at Yale School of Management.").
125481 U.S. 1 (1987).
"
26See THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., OIL AND HONOR: THE TEXACO-PENNZOIL WARS (G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 1987).
"'Id. at 191-99.
"8M. at 371.
129id.
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complexity, but attributive causation at another level, viewing the lack of a contract
as the direct result of Pennzoil having reneged on the moral deal. To put it a
different way, it is consistent with an analytic and objective approach for a lawyer to
pick apart the circumstances, apply the relevant legal precepts on the non-binding
effect of "agreements to agree" or the statute of frauds, and make the argument that
there never was a contract, even though Arthur Liman testified that one of the Getty
lawyers said at the time of the handshake, "Congratulations, Arthur. You've got
yourself a deal!"' 3° The mistake here is interpreting the events at the wrong level.
The jurors, I would suggest, applying a common sense view of the circumstances,
took the words at their face value. Lipton's testimony, on the other hand, was
impertinent as the mugger's explanation for his attack on the victim in terms of nerve
synapses and muscle contractions.
B. Games, Models, and Ethics in Accounting
We have already seen that financial accounting is a powerful language game
which nevertheless operates to model the financial condition of a business. Without
being willing to step back and ponder the reality-the ontology-of the business and
the financial modeling, it will be difficult to engage in the very pragmatic exercise of
deciding: (1) what is true, and (2) what is the right thing to do.
The problem arises because there is a game-model antinomy to accounting. We
can make persuasive arguments either way. Let us assert that financial accounting is
a model, and we will be correct. Even analysts want GAAP results to be modified so
as to better understand the ongoing state of the business. The best evidence of this is
a heretofore not widely explored aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley-the requirement that pro
forma earnings statements be reconciled to GAAP."' The most sophisticated
observers of publicly-held companies and consumers of public company financial
information-the stock analysts-do in fact want a shared syntax, but it is directed at
a particular value, defined loosely as the future earning power of the company.
GAAP takes account of many historical events that do not impact this value, and
companies and analysts have longed attempted to manipulate GAAP to understand it.
For example, companies (and their analysts) view some expenses as non-recurring,
and so prefer to see pro forma earnings calculations that remove the expense from
what would otherwise be a presentation of the financials in accordance with GAAP.
But let us also assert that accounting is a game, and we will be correct. There are
arbitrary game-like constitutive rules to accounting. As in comedy, timing is
everything. In the long run, there should be no difference between cash flow and net
income; the fact that they vary is due to timing. And the game still has consequence,
because earnings, whether in conformity with GAAP or adjusted as permitted by
Sarbanes-Oxley, are still a surrogate for value. The conduct of some lawyers in the
backdating scandals suggest to me that they were co-opted, or neutralized, into the
accounting game, at the cost of losing sight of a move to satisfy the rules of that
"Old. at 192.
13'Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, SEC and Exchange Committee
Release No. 33-8176, 2003 SEC LEXIS 193, at *7 (Jan. 22, 2003).
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game (placing a fictitious date on a document) conflicted with an ordinary norm of
the real world-do not falsify documents.'32
When companies report their earnings, are they obliged to think of the truth in the
context of using the financial statements as a model to explain the state of the
business? Or are they obliged to think of the truth in the context of winning the
financial statement reporting game (in which the object is to state the highest
possible earnings within the rules as interpreted)? We like to think of ourselves as
truth-tellers, but the line between true and false can be indistinct, and even our
willingness to tolerate some level of dishonesty may be more than we might
otherwise admit, not the least of which is the neutralization that occurs upon our
entry into the linguistic community of the corporation.
The most direct instance of a lawyer's regular invitation to play the game is in the
assessment of litigation loss contingency. A present calculation based on future
events is a prediction of the likelihood that a contingency event will occur. The way
accounting is required to treat that contingency is set forth in the Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards 5 ("FAS 5") promulgated by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board. Under FAS 5, the accounting profession uses the word
"probable" to indicate one of three different states of likelihood-the other two are
"reasonably possible" and "remote"-that future events will confirm the incurrence
of a liability.'
If an event is probable and the amount of the loss is reasonably estimable, FAS 5
requires that the obligation be booked as an accrual (an expense, and hence a charge
to earnings) on the income statement and a liability on the balance sheet. "Probable"
is defined as "[t]he future event or events are likely to occur." Telling an auditor one
has a better chance of losing a case in which the amount of the loss can be estimated
is tantamount to incurring the expense. Lawyers, on the other hand, use loose
language of probability to convey a sense of the outcome to their clients on a regular
basis: "Your odds of winning are 50-50, 60-40, one in ten, etc." The result is an
uneasy truce between the legal and accounting professions, which the ABA has
attempted to explain in its Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to
Auditors' Requests for Information:
Concepts of probability inherent in the usage of terms like "probable" or
"reasonably possible" or "remote" mean different things in different
contexts. Generally, the outcome of, or the loss which may result from,
litigation cannot be assessed in any way that is comparable to a
statistically or empirically determined concept of "probability" ... .
Lawyers do not generally quantify for clients the "odds" in numerical
terms; if they do, the quantification is generally only undertaken in an
effort to make meaningful, for limited purposes, a whole host of
judgmental factors applicable at a particular time, with any intention to
132Justin Scheck, A Backdating Doubleheader, CORP. CouNs. Nov. 2007, at 20 (stating the
SEC filed a complaint against a lawyer who allegedly organized a backdating scheme,
claiming, among other things, that the lawyer "wrote a memorandum in November 1998 in
which she acknowledged that repricing executive stock options by using an earlier grant date
with a lower price would result in [the company] having to take 'a charge to its P&L.').
133AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (1987), AU § 337C, at 407.
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depict "probability" in any statistical, scientific or empirically-grounded
sense. 1
34
Each year, and some times each quarter, the auditors will ask to meet with the
general counsel to discuss pending cases. The auditors, speaking the language of
FAS, will ask how probable it is that a particular case will come out badly, and if so,
for how much. A general counsel inclined to play the financial statement game, and
understanding the difference between legal language of contingency and accounting
language of contingency, and understanding that if she merely calls the adverse
outcome "reasonably possible" the case will be disclosed in the contingency footnote
but not reflected as a charge, the general counsel might turn to the CEO or CFO, and
state, "Tell me how you want it to come out on the income statement, and then I will
answer."
V. GAMES, MODELS, EXPLANATION, AND UNDERSTANDING
Applying "aboutness," "thingness," models, and games to the lawyer's task of
making sense of the world seems to me a more accessible and pragmatic articulation
of a debate about thinking that has gone on for the last hundred years or so.
Lawyers, particularly the academic versions, straddle interdisciplinary discussions of
science and morality, description and normativityY 5 Robert Ellickson captures
nicely what seems to me to be the central issue facing legal scholars: the now
century-old demarcation between scientific inquiry and moral normativity.'36 In his
critique of critical theory, Professor Ellickson observed: "A creative tension between
the yin of social-scientific universalizers and the yang of humanistic particularizers
thus promises to benefit all participants in the legal academy."' 37  The creative
tension Ellickson identifies has its source in the polarities between modeling and
game playing, between what we seem to be able to know outwardly and objectively
in the world, and the idealized products of reason that we come to believe (or believe
we know) inwardly and subjectively. At one extreme, the "naturalists" want to
understand the normative by way of "a scientific understanding of our cognitive
abilities."' 38 At the other extreme is critical theory, in which any assertion of truth is
suspect, and even the hypothesizing of the natural scientist comes into question.'39
1341d. at 409-10.
'
3 5See William W. Fisher, III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal
History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1088 (1997).
Professor Fisher had a goal similar to mine in this article. He wanted what he called a
"pragmatist approach to historical methodology." Id. Considering the four dominant
approaches to intellectual history, his objective was "to encourage legal historians, by
example, to think critically about what they are trying to achieve and which methodology (or
combination or reconfiguration of methodologies) would best advance their ends." Id.
136K. A. APPIAH, THINKING IT THOUGH: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
157-63 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2003).
'
37Robert C. Ellickson, The Twilight of Critical Theory: A Reply to Litowitz, 15 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 333 (2003).
138j. HABERMAS, TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION 23 (Barbara Fultner, ed., The MIT Press,
2003) (1999). This is exemplified in the writing of Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins and
in the attempts to apply evolutionary biology to the law. Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology:
Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 167 (1997).
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The maxim that only a foolish lawyer has himself for a client recognizes the
difficulty of applying objective and universal laws when we are game players and
have to decide what to do. I would recast Professor Ellickson's tension: between the
yin of social-scientific objectifiers, and the yang of humanistic subjectivizers.
Objectifiers look to explain data by means of formal theories and systems;
subjectivizers look at the world from a personal standpoint. Researchers observe the
world from a third-person perspective, and thereby discern universals of human
behavior that purport to be removed from any personal or instrumental bias.
Participants know only the world as they see it, and any universals pale in
comparison to the needs and desires of the participant. Moreover, participants
operate not only in the real world about which the observers are modeling; they also
are players in games that are not models, but things in themselves. Game players
must credit, on one hand, their sense that they can draw something approaching
universal conclusions about rightness and wrongness in game playing decisions; on
the other hand, they must credit their sense that there is a difference between the
cognition of objective truth in the empirical world and this sense of rightness. 4 '
All forms of judgmental or decision-making reasoning have a moment in which
there is an indeterminate or intuitive or mysterious leap. There are analytical and
reasoning tools-deductive, inductive, abductive, analogical-to approach or isolate
the factors in an explanation or a decision, but ultimately both the hypothesis and the
course of action are leaps from what we know to what we do not, and in the moment
of that leap all forms of reason lead back to something that we seem only to account
for empirically as something like "intuition." Scott Brewer observes this about
analogical reasoning: "The mystics [referring to a particular group of scholars] are
correct that there is inevitably an uncodifiable imaginative moment in exemplary,
analogical reasoning."'' To the extent we see ourselves as scientists, it is difficult to
let go of the hope of explaining that leap in scientific (read: predictive) terms, yet we
soldier on, looking for, analogically, a way to square the circle.
The issue is our respect for the rational force of the different ways in which we
make that leap. At least one leading cognitive scientist-philosopher, Douglas
Hofstadter, contends that the comparison of patterns in perceived data-the process
of analogy-is at the core of all human thought, and that "analogy has force in
proportion to its precision and visibility."'42 Professor Hofstadter writes:
Mature human brains are constantly trying to reduce the complexity of
what they perceive, and this means that they are constantly trying to get
unfamiliar, complex patterns made of many symbols that have been
freshly activated in concert to trigger just one familiar pre-existing symbol
Part of Douglas Hofstadter's great charm (and hence, I suspect, his popularity) is that he wants
to be a social science universalizer, but is so clearly a person imbued with mysterious
intuition. See generally infra note 142.
139Stephen W. Ball, Facts, Values, and Interpretation in Law: Jurisprudence from
Perspectives in Ethics and Philosophy of Science, 38 AM. J. Juius. 15, 30-33 (1993) (citing
HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981)).
4*Ball, supra note 139, at 28.
14 'Brewer, supra note 96, at 954.
142DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, I AM A STRANGE LOop 155 (2007).
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(or a very small set of them). In fact, that's the main business of human
brains-to take a complex situation and to put one's finger on what
matters in it, to distill from an initial welter of sensations and ideas what a
situation is really all about. To spot the gist.'43
When we try to unpack "spotting the gist" (i.e., think about thinking), it is helpful
to consider the two polarities we used to distinguish modeling and game-playing.
First, there is the polarity of the descriptive versus the normative. Modeling is a
descriptive exercise, because we want to get to the gist of what matters with as little
information as possible that is still an accurate prediction of the real world. Game-
playing is a normative exercise, because we are in the game and need to decide what
we ought to do. Second, there is the polarity of objectivity versus subjectivity.
Modeling is objective; game playing is subjective.
For most of us, however, spotting the gist falls somewhere in the middle. That
the objective facts of the physical world should be tested by scientific means is
beyond question. Nevertheless, we have strong intuitions about norms and reasons,
and resist (why, of course, is not entirely clear) "the very alienating scientization of
intuitive knowledge."'" And when we deal in human interaction, the subject of
social science, spotting the gist becomes more than the ascription of theory to a set of
empirically observed facts. In the swirl of human action in which, for example, the
law of transactions applies, it becomes clear that there are methods of thinking that
have rational force in some contexts but not in others. Sometimes we need to
explain what happened in the human interaction with the granularity and rigor of
science, and sometimes we need to make sense of it by understanding its meaning.
All of this is a recasting of a long standing debate in the philosophy of social
science. The literature is replete with intellectual histories of the separation of
explanation, or objective science, from understanding, or the search for purpose and
meaning (called "interpretation" or "hermeneutics") since the mid-nineteenth
century.'45 I see it as a debate over which of several legitimate ways of "spotting the
gist" we will apply as the means of making sense of cause-and-effect at particular
levels of complexity. Sometimes we are modelers. We uncover and explain things.
This bespeaks causal explanations, algorithmic functions, mathematical models, and
laws (of nature, not the sovereign). We are separated subjects thinking about the
object."
William Fisher made this point in his discussion of the possible pragmatic
objectives of intellectual legal history. One might well be to "[f]ormulate general
laws of social development" in the manner of Hempel's covering laws.'47
1431d. at 277.
'"HABERMAS, supra note 138, at 24.
'45See generally, e.g., Haskell, Objectivity, supra note 82; Haskell, Social Science, supra
note 82; Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Literary Criticisms of Law (2000).
'46That of course is my view. For a critique of the view within the intellectual history of
American law that "the subject/object dichotomy, the notion that the social world can
meaningfully be described by separating subjective and objective realms of social life," see
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1154 (1985).
147Fisher, supra note 135, at 1092.
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Nevertheless, Professor Fisher observed that while historian do not generally credit
Hempel's thesis, "one effect of the continued grip of logical positivism on American
law schools is that legal historians are more inclined than other historians to extract
from their work broad generalizations about social life."' 48 Ultimately, attributive
cause-and-effect will be unsatisfying to the social scientists of the law for the reasons
Professor Fisher articulates, and which are borne out by Professor Ellickson's
dichotomy. Interpretation or attributive cause-and-effect brings "an anti-
foundationalist, perspectival stance that corrodes scientism. The more one
acknowledges the inevitable impact of the interpreter on the data she interprets, the
less reliable appear general laws derived from a cluster of individual
interpretations."' 49
The scientific justification of contract formalism proposed by Schwartz and Scott
is a case in point. The problem is not that they opt for a formal approach that
operates independently of whatever the individual or mutual intentions of the parties
might have been. Whether they are right or wrong in the construction of the model is
a matter, no pun intended, of entirely valid academic interest. Rather the problem is
the apparent fixation on social science universalizing to the extent that they confuse
explanatory cause in the abstract with attribute individual motivations in individual
cases. When we look to make sense of the actions of individual people, we have to
ask whether scientific analysis (Langdellian or economic) is the best way to make
sense.1
50
Contract interpretation is, indeed, a subset of interpretation, and Michael
Moore's eminently sensible words on that topic are apropos. Trying to divine the
intention of the author (or authors) is not interpretation; it is a form of scientific
inquiry-an explanation of the author's intent. The hermeneutical insight is that
"certain dominant activities within ... disciplines cannot be forced to conform to the
methods of ordinary scientific description or explanation, nor are such activities
justified by the normal scientific goals of prediction, explanation, and
understanding."''
148id
1491d. There is an ironic twist here. What the scientific universalizers share with moral
universalizers is the teleology, on one hand, of "final cause" or telos, in the Aristotelian sense,
and teleology of moral ends accessible by reason in the Kantian sense. Id.
15°And a similar irony exists a kind of determinism that arises out of science or philosophy
that holds intentionality of the individual to be hostage either to, in the first instance, the
micro-operation of the atoms, molecules and bio-chemistry of the brain, or in the second, the
macro-operation of power structures to which the critical theorists object. Professor Fisher
referred to Thomas Haskell's views on this topic:
The central tenets of the (then) new method-that ideas have no meaning out of a
particular interpretive context and that basic presuppositions control the way we view
reality, not vice versa-reinforce, [Haskell] contended, "the 'despairingly
deterministic view of the past and present' that too many students now hold."
Id. at 1100, citing Thomas L. Haskell, Determinist Implications of Intellectual History, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 134 (John Higham & Paul K. Conkin eds.,
1979).
151Michael S. Moore, Interpreting Interpretation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 5 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1997).
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To the contrary, Moore observes there is a text if people regard the phenomenon
as a text. Interpretation, rather than explanation, means: (1) people have a good
reason, (2) to treat some phenomenon they do not yet know the meaning of as being
meaningful, (3) in the sense that such meanings give them either reasons for belief or
reasons for action. As to (2), there is a distinction between syntax and semantics.
The text is organized syntactically so as to suggest it has meaning, but the actual
meaning is a matter of semantics, and we do not know what the text means.
Interpretation is to use the text in a way that we impute the semantics from the very
interpretation of the text itself. To put it another way, to search for mutual intention
is empty because if there is a present dispute, and it is colorable, there never was a
mutual intention, or at least one that is knowable.'52 We have instead the
interpretation of a text where we acknowledge its syntactical correctness, but we do
not quite know what it means. Contract formalism is instead the acknowledgment of
the limits of legal science. That science tries to arrive at the answer by unearthing
the intention of the authors. The real exercise is one of interpretation in Moore's
terms: the process of supplying meaning to a text everyone seems to agree with
should mean something, but everyone does not know, or cannot agree on, what.
Hence, contract interpretation, like many exercises a lawyer may be required to
undertake, is not a problem to be explained and therefore solved by a scientific
algorithm. When the parties make the contract, whether they are individual or
business executives, they understand and they make sense within the game. The
contract is about their relationship. The purposes are those of the parties, and may or
may not align to form an immanent "mutual intention."
Modeling is an exercise in reductionism; it seeks to explain behavior consistently
and without contradiction. Yet life contradicts.'53 Nevertheless, most people (to
152Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Bewitchment of Intelligence: Language and Ex Post Illusions
ofIntention, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 99, 99 (2005).
153The reductionist and non-reductionist views of the law are captured in the views of the
eminent British philosopher of law, J.W. Harris, and a response from his one-time student,
Brian Bix. Harris claimed that there are four reasoning steps that form the basis of the practice
of legal science, namely exclusion (there are a determinate number of sources that identify the
legal system); subsumption (there is a hierarchical structure that organizes legal rules);
derogation (the rejection of a rule because of conflict with another rule originating in a
superior source), and non-contradiction (the legal system cannot affirm and deny the existence
of a duty in an identical situation). J.W. HARRIS, LAW AND LEGAL SCIENCE: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE CONCEPTS LEGAL RULE AND LEGAL SYSTEM 10-11 (1979). Moreover, Harris's attempt to
identify the units of the legal system (positive legal rules) was expressly "reductionist in
nature. It means that descriptive statements in legal science which are not descriptive of duty-
imposing or duty-excepting rules are reducible to statements about the conditions under which
the duties imposed by various rules exist." Id. at 21. Brian Bix, who was one of Harris'
students, responded:
Reductionism in legal theory raises standard questions regarding theorizing generally
about social practices and institutions: in particular, the costs and benefits of
simplification in the construction of models and theories .... By contrast, what are
we to say about (descriptive or conceptual) theories about the nature of law? To
evaluate theories about the nature of law- either at the level of particular theories, or
at the level of generalized advice about such theories (e.g., whether to have reductive
or complex theories)--one must start with a distinct sense of the purpose of such
theories. To ask that theories about the nature of law offer useful predictions is to
misunderstand what they are about. Theories about the nature of law are not--or not,
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their great fortune) do not worry about how they make sense of things; they just go
about their business making sense of things. Even people who insist that the only
way to make sense of things is through statements of universal laws of nature,
falsifiable by contrary evidence, have accepted some notion of meaning and purpose,
even if it is nothing more than the expectation that there is an underlying order to the
universal laws that justifies even engaging in scientific theory. What seems clear to
me, however, is that only academic lawyers or ideologues have the luxury of taking a
position at the extremes, whether it is rejecting any objectivity so that we view every
explanation as a reflection of the power and position of the person or institution
doing the explaining, 54 or rejecting any rational force in the search for meaning and
purpose versus scientific explanation.55
Were we able to compartmentalize our lives so that we were always modelers
during certain time periods, and always game players in another, perhaps it would be
easier to know which standard of "spotting the gist" to apply. The real world does
not work that way. Coming to believe that the model of the world really is the
world, or failing to understand that the game is a thing in itself and its rules are
binding are both category errors to which lawyers (and their teachers) can fall victim.
VI. CONCLUSION
Business people and their lawyers are doers. They absorb and synthesize data
about the world, using it to predict the impact of decisions, and then make decisions
not only about what they might do, but what they ought to do. It is a process
continually of modeling and game-playing. So it is hardly controversial to assert that
how we go about explaining why things happen in the world impacts the judgments
we might make about what to do. My thesis is simply that there are different ways
of making sense of what is and what ought to be, and the possibility of error exists
when they are inappropriately applied. Sometimes we are modeling; sometimes we
are game-playing. If we were only modeling the physical world, the answers would
almost always arise out of objective theorizing-in Thomas Haskell's words,
"explanatory cause." But when we are game-playing, we are also subjects in the
game with intentionality. So objective modeling of the behavior of others with
intentionality becomes more complex. Making sense requires that we understand the
intentionality as well.
primarily-empirical claims about current or future behaviors, but rather efforts to
offer explanations and insights regarding the nature of a particular social institution
(that is also a reason-giving practice).
Brian Bix, Reductionism and Explanation in Legal Theory, in PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOuR OF JIM HARRIS 45-46 (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2006).
154See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 4 (1983).
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My claim, ultimately, is not a critical indictment of reductive methods. It is,
however, a rejection of reductivism as the only, or even the best, way to search for
answers in the area of the law I know best, that pertaining to business, corporations,
commerce, and transactions. It is an invitation to dabble in ontology, and to arrive at
the conclusion that purely reductive thinking, and the failure to incorporate a search
for meaning has two negative implications. First, as an academic matter, the attempt
to explain human aspiration, particularly in the area of contracts and transactions,
through social-scientific universalizing, is fundamentally flawed. Second, and more
important, there is a real danger of co-optation-to the extent the participants lose
touch with the underlying social reality-into regulatory systems so complex that
they appear to take on "thingness" rather than mere "aboutness."
We are, for the most part, the inheritors of a division of the process of thinking
into academic disciplines over the last two hundred years. JUrgen Habermas
describes it as a continuing dualism between the natural sciences "whose aim it is to
formulate and verify hypotheses concerning the laws governing empirical
regularities," and "the historical-hermeneutic sciences, which appropriate and
analyze meaningful cultural entities handed down by tradition. '15 6 Indeed, Guyora
Binder and Robert Weisberg contend that in the nineteenth century, law and
literature developed not just as different professions, but as alternative, if not
competing, ways of making sense of the world:
[W]e may conceive law more broadly as an ordering function, a process
of identifying, allocating, and contesting authority, that pervades all
spheres of social life. In the same way we may identify "the literary"...
more broadly with imagination, complexity of perception, density of
meaning, and the qualities of dramatic and aesthetic interest.157
That historical division continues to pervade, if not the practice of law, the
thinking about how law models the complex reality of social life. The word "model"
is critical here. There can be little doubt that the dominant modes of thinking about
the law since Langdell have aspired to the precision of scientific modeling, the
process by which Habermas observes that natural science methods have extended
themselves "far beyond the sphere of the theoretical natural sciences, into
psychology and economics, sociology and political science."' 58  Moreover, this
divide separated the dispassion of scientific discourse, and its search for universal
and objective truths, from the personal and expressive search for meaning through
the humanities. 59 Personal expression appears today, if at all, in critical reaction to
the predominant reduction mode.
A wholly social-scientific approach to the explanation, rather than the
understanding, of human behavior, particularly in areas that have the potential to
invoke the legal system, is not wholly inappropriate, but merely sterile."6 For some
156JURGEN HABERMAS, ON THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1 (Shierry Weber Nicholsen
& Jerry A. Stark trans., 1988).
t
57GuYoRA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRiTICIsMs OF LAW 5 (2000).
158HABERMAS, supra note 156, at 1.
159BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 157, at 7.
160In the words of Philippe Nonet:
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of us, though, the methods of social science explain and edify, but often fail to
satisfy. The algorithms of mathematical models of human behavior tantalize and
fascinate us, but we wonder whether algorithmic thinking begins to substitute models
for life, or, as Gabriel Marcel complained, lose sight of the mysteries and to be
distracted by puzzles.16' The academic study of law is not immune from algorithmic
or formalistic thinking. But the search for the algorithm continues in, for example,
the predictive science of economics, or the many "law and" disciplines. Indeed, the
mission of the academy to explain, as a matter of science, rather than to understand,
as a matter of meaning, sits (in my experience as both practitioner of some twenty-
six years and as an academic and theorist) at the heart of the gap between some (but
not all) in the legal academy and the profession. If the answers were easy, if we
could take rules, principles and theories and apply them algorithmically to the facts,
there would be no basis on which we might distinguish great leaders, inspirational
teachers, and wise judges. Out in the world of corporate governance, mergers,
business transactions, family counseling, and estate planning, our clients esteem
wisdom and judgment, and it is seldom formal or algorithmic, and yet rarely
nihilistic.
What then is it to hear and keep the word of law? . . .Never can it be captured in
anything like the proposition of rules, principles, theories, interpretations, etc. Any
attempt to do so would produce only sterile dogma. To keep the word of law is to stay
in awe within the truth of an advent, namely the advent of the gift of understanding.
Philippe Nonet, Judgment, 48 VAND. L. REv. 987, 1003 (1995).
16 t GABRIEL MARCEL, THE MYSTERY OF BEING, VOL. 1: REFLECTION AND MYSTERY 211-12
(G.S. Fraser, trans. 2001) (1950).
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VII. APPENDIX A
The idea of cause has been tangled up with purpose in the history of physical and
social science since Aristotle, and a sense of purpose is teleology. Aristotle's causes
mixed in a sense of essential purpose for the thing, and much of the history of
physical and social science is an attempt to pull descriptions of causation out of the
grip of teleology Scientific causality should be devoid of all notions of
intentionality, it is thought, whether the system being studied is one of physics or one
of sociology. Hence, we would not think of the forces in a feedback system like a
thermostat or a toilet float to have the intention of seeking equilibrium. "[A]n
explanation of the teleological structure of a thermostat can be accounted for and
made nonarbitrary by reference to causal mechanisms making up the thermostat and
the causal act of setting the thermostat."" The goal of social science may be as well
to expunge teleology from explanation, "[b]ut in the case of artificial systems the
mechanisms are real, understood, and causal. Applying these ideas to human agents
or social systems is analogical."''. And, indeed, while we may be able to accomplish
this task for social institutions, doing so for individual human agents is more
problematic.iv
The fundamental question is where social institutions or objects sit with respect
to the continuum between physical cause and willful intention. Or, as Professor
Turner asks: "to what extent are they 'real,' or, put differently, do they possess any
explanatory force beyond the elements of human action and physical causality that
compose them?" vWe might conclude that it is as absurd to ascribe end-seeking to a
social system as it is to the thermostat. The thermostat does not "intend" to
equilibrate. Similarly, in social systems, end-seeking is a property that adds no
explanatory content--everything that happens does so because of the arrangement of
causal mechanisms such as the feedback mechanisms that do the work of directing
the system toward the end state.vi The "ends" are a consequence of the arrangement
of mechanisms, rather than something that adds predictive power or explanatory
force to the explanation. viThat is to say, the social system appears to be purposive
only because of the human intention feeding back into it, and not because of
anything inherent in the system itself.
The attribution of purpose or meaning to social institutions, it turns out, sits in
another one of those imponderable places between polarities in how we make sense
of systems. Paul Roth distinguishes the role of explanation from the role of
understanding or meaning in the social sciences: "Explainers pose the study of
'See Stephen P. Turner, Cause, the Persistence of Teleology, and the Origins of the
Philosophy of Social Science, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 21-41 (Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth eds., 2003).
"Id. at 30.
"Id.
ivld. at 34.
vid.
VId. at 35.
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human qua social beings as continuous with the study of humans qua natural objects.
Understanders conceive of the human sciences as sui generis, a realm of study of
nonnatural objects constituted by values and interests."vi" Although Turner never
uses the word "teleology," it seems to me this is precisely what he is describing-the
purposive nature of social structures. The natural sciences cannot incorporate the
world of social experience, the argument runs, because value-orientation defines that
world. It is one dominated by actions influenced by and "directed towards objects
that are not things in the world-for example, religious beliefs, personal
relationships, loyalties to groups and institutions.""' His question is whether there is
science that can be applied to issues of understanding versus explanation, and, more
importantly, first, whether a principled divide between understanding and
explanation is possible, and second, whether understanding "creates orderings not
ascertainable by methods for studying how the natural order orders."' The analogy is
to understanding a text; we assume that we can derive understanding of social
phenomena by use of cultural artifacts that are evidence of meaning, that meanings
can be translated into the observer's idiom, and that, as translated, the events can be
interpreted in a way that has rational force. Roth's conclusion is that this inquiry is
not helpful; it tells us more about the observers and their interactions with each other
than it does to resolve conflicting interpretation of the same data.x My point,
however, is that the existence of the debate tells us something about the tendency to
teleology, the ascription of meaning and purpose to non-natural ordering as though it
were capable of scientific explanation."' As Roth says, "[m]aking social factors part
of the world humans share marks them as real; their role in structuring behaviors
gives them claim to systematicity, and so objects of a science.
Nevertheless, there is a history (if criticized) of attributing collective
consciousness to human systems. But my take on it is slightly different. As I
discuss in the text, with sufficient complexity, the social system is real to us, so real
that it at times appears to take on consciousness of the kind both Professors Smith
and Hofstadter perceive, as in "the Law requires that we .... ",'
i"iPaul A. Roth, Beyond Understanding: The Career of the Concept of Understanding in
the Human Sciences, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
311 (Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth eds., 2003).
ixId
"
XId. at 312.
Xild
"
xiId at 326.
Xiiid, at 312.
xivSee SMITH, supra note 41; HOFSTADTER, supra note 44.
[Vol. 56:613
HeinOnline  -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  662 2008
51
Lipshaw: Models and Games: The Difference between Explanation and Understa
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
